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1. INTRODUCTION 
On 4 September 2010, a magnitude Mw 7.1 earthquake struck the Canterbury region on the 
South Island of New Zealand. The epicentre of the earthquake was located in the Darfield 
area about 40 km west of the city of Christchurch. Extensive damage occurred to 
unreinforced masonry buildings throughout the region during the mainshock and subsequent 
large aftershocks. Particularly extensive damage was inflicted to lifelines and residential 
houses due to widespread liquefaction and lateral spreading in areas close to major streams, 
rivers and wetlands throughout Christchurch and Kaiapoi. Despite the severe damage to 
infrastructure and residential houses, fortunately, no deaths occurred and only two injuries 
were reported in this earthquake. From an engineering viewpoint, one may argue that the 
most significant aspects of the 2010 Darfield Earthquake were geotechnical in nature, with 
liquefaction and lateral spreading being the principal culprits for the inflicted damage. 
Following the earthquake, a geotechnical reconnaissance was conducted over a period of six 
days (10–15 September 2010) by a team of geotechnical/earthquake engineers and geologists 
from New Zealand and USA (GEER team: Geo-engineering Extreme Event Reconnaissance). 
The team included the following members: 
• Assoc. Prof. Misko Cubrinovski – NZ Lead (University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New 
Zealand) 
• Assoc. Prof. Russell A. Green – US Lead (Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA, USA) 
• Mr. Tom Algie – (University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand) 
• Mr. John Allen – (TRI/Environmental, Inc., Austin, TX, USA) 
• Prof. Scott Ashford – (Oregon State University, Corvallis, OR, USA) 
• Mr. Jawad Arefi – (University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand) 
• Dr. Elisabeth Bowman – (University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand) 
• Dr. Brendon Bradley – (University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand) 
• Assist. Prof. Brady Cox – (University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, AR, USA) 
• Dr. William Godwin – (Fugro William Lettis and Associates, Inc., Walnut Creek, CA, USA) 
• Prof. Tara Hutchinson – (University of California, San Diego, CA, USA) 
• Prof. Edward Kavazanjian – (Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA) 
• Dr. Tam Larkin – (University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand) 
• Dr. Rolando Orense – (University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand) 
• Prof. Michael Pender – (University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand) 
• Dr. Mark Quigley – (University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand) 
• Ms. Kelly Robinson – (University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand) 
• Mr. Merrick Taylor – (University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand) 
• Dr. Thomas Wilson – (University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand) 
• Dr. Liam Wotherspoon – (University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand) 
 
The following JGS (Japanese Geotechnical Society) members from Japan also participated in 
the reconnaissance team from 13 to 15 September 2010: 
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• Prof. Mitsu Okamura – JGS Lead (Ehime University, Matsuyama, Japan) 
• Assoc. Prof. Takashi Kiyota – (Institute of Industrial Science, University of Tokyo, Tokyo, 
Japan) 
• Assoc. Prof. Hirofumi Toyota – (Nagaoka University of Technology, Nagaoka, Japan) 
 
The NZ, GEER and JGS members worked as one team and shared resources, information and 
logistics in order to conduct thorough and most efficient reconnaissance covering a large area 
over a very limited time period. This report summarises the key evidence and findings from 
the reconnaissance. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed 
in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 
associated organisations and funding agencies. 
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2. GEOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
Summary 
At 4:35 am on September 4th NZ Standard Time (16:35 Sept 3rd UTC) the rupture of a 
previously unrecognized strike-slip fault beneath the Canterbury Plains of New Zealand’s 
South Island produced a Mw 7.1 earthquake that caused widespread damage throughout the 
region. Although this earthquake caused much damage to the Canterbury region, it also 
allowed documenting the dynamics and effects of a major strike-slip fault rupture in the 
fortuitous absence of death or major injuries. The low relief and well maintained agricultural 
landscape of the Canterbury Plains has provided an ideal environment to characterise even 
the most subtle of earthquake-related ground deformation at high resolution. This chapter 
summarizes the basic geological context and ground rupture characteristics of the earthquake. 
 
Geological context for the Darfield (Canterbury) earthquake 
The tectonic plate boundary between the Australian (A) and Pacific (P) Plates passes through 
the South Island of New Zealand, where subduction of the Hikurangi Plateau to the north 
transitions into a continent-continent collision zone associated with the collision of the 
Chatham Rise with continental crust of the Australian Plate (Figure 2.1). The A and P plates 
converge obliquely at 48–39 mm yr−1 in New Zealand. The resultant collision zone between 
these plates is not a line on a map; rather it is a distributed zone of active faults each with 
their own capability of generating large earthquakes throughout/around New Zealand. The 
Marlborough Fault Zone consists of a series of large, ‘transpressional’ faults that record 
primarily right-lateral displacement with a component of shortening, resulting in mountain 
uplift. These faults ultimately link to the Alpine Fault, which accommodates ~70-75% of the 
total relative plate boundary motion between the A-P Plates with a values of 27 ± 5 mm yr−1 
of strike-slip and 5–10mmyr−1 of dip-slip (see review in Norris & Cooper 2001). The 
remaining ~30% of A-P plate motion is accommodated by slip on a series of faults 
throughout the Southern Alps and Canterbury Plains. The Greendale Fault, which was the 
source of the 2010 Darfield (Canterbury) earthquake, is one of these structures, although it 
was not recognized prior to this earthquake. Much of the motion is likely taken up on other 
big faults, such as the Porter’s Pass Fault, which has a slip rate of 3-7 mm yr-1 (3–5 mm yr−1; 
e.g. Cowan et al. 1996; Howard et al. 2005; 7 mm yr-1; Wallace et al., 2007). Modelling of 
GPS-derived velocity fields suggests a strain rate of ?2 mm yr−1 of WNW oriented 
permanent contraction for the region east of the Porter’s Pass Fault to offshore of 
Christchurch that hosts the Greendale Fault (“Canterbury Block”; Wallace et al., 2007). 
There are several structures in this region, both expressed at the surface and ‘hidden’ beneath 
the surface, that pose an earthquake hazard to Christchurch (e.g., Hororata Fault, Hororata 
anticline, Springbank Fault, Bobby’s Creek Fault, Greendale Fault). E-W trending faults are 
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present throughout Canterbury and offshore on the Chatham Rise, and some of these are now 
'active' faults (i.e. faults that have had large earthquakes in the last ~10,000 yrs and/or have 
the potential to generate earthquakes in the modern setting). In a general sense, E-W trending 
faults like the Greendale fault tend to be strike-slip dominated faults  (e.g., Porter’s Pass 
Fault; Bobby’s Creek Fault, Ashley Fault) while NE-SW to N-S trending faults tend to be 
reverse-slip dominated faults with smaller components of strike-slip (e.g., Springfield Fault, 
Springbank Fault, Hororata Fault). As is clear from this recent earthquake, it is important to 
obtain more information on the locations of all active faults beneath the Canterbury Plains 
(via geophysical and mapping investigations) and earthquake histories of all faults (via 
mapping and paleoseismic analysis) in order to better understand the risk that these structures 
pose to the Canterbury region (Pettinga et al., 2001). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 A-P plate boundary through New Zealand and convergence rates of P relative to A 
Plate. (Image courtesy of Jarg Pettinga) 
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The September 2010 Darfield (Canterbury) earthquake  
The epicentre of the earthquake was located approximately 10 km southeast of the town of 
Darfield (Figure 2.2) with a focal depth of ~10km. Preliminary USGS and global centroid 
moment tensor solutions indicated the mainshock was associated with almost pure dextral 
(right-lateral) strike-slip slip on a subvertical nearly E-W striking fault plane. The event 
produced a ≥28-km long, dextral strike-slip surface rupture trace, aligned approximately 
west-east (Figure 2.2). Using data from New Zealand national and strong-motion seismic 
networks, GNS seismologists have proposed that the rupture process involved a component 
of reverse faulting at depth. In the month following the mainshock, the region has incurred 
thousands of aftershocks of ML>2 including eleven aftershocks of ML≥5.0. A ML 5.2 
aftershock on September 8th (NZST) located ~7km southeast of the city centre at a depth of 
~6km caused further damage to city infrastructure. The frequency of ML>2 aftershocks has 
decreased by an order of magnitude since the days immediately following the mainshock 
although the possibility of M≥5 earthquakes still remains, as the region adjusts to the crustal 
deformation associated with the mainshock.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Aerial image of the Christchurch area with the surface fault rupture and the 
epicentre of the Darfield earthquake are denoted. The image is ~117 km across. 
Greendale fault 
epicentre 
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Aftershock distributions proximal to the E-W trending part of the Greendale fault are 
dominated by ~E-W trending dextral strike-slip mechanisms, as expected from kinematic 
analysis of the patterns of ground rupture. A NE-trending cloud of aftershocks west of the 
Greendale fault, between Hororata and the Rakaia River is dominated by ~NE trending thrust 
fault mechanisms. A NE-trending cloud of aftershocks north of the Greendale fault, between 
Darfield and the Waimakariri River is a mixture of ~NE trending thrust fault and strike-slip 
fault mechanisms. A NNW-trending swarm of seismicity from ~5 km north of Rolleston 
south to Lincoln consists of a mixture of NW-trending normal fault mechanisms and 
(probably) E-W trending dextral strike slip mechanisms. The NE and NW trending belts of 
seismicity are consistent with field observations of subtle deformation in these localities 
although these aspects require further research. 
 
Characteristics of the surface fault rupture 
The zone of identified surface rupture extends from ~4km WNW of the hamlet of Greendale 
for about 28 km to an eastern tip ~2 km NW of the town of Rolleston (Figure 2.2). Offsets 
and fracture patterns reveal up to 4.6 meters of displacement, with an average displacement 
of ~2.3 m across the entire rupture. Figure 2.3 shows comparisons of the average and 
maximum fault displacements with global fault data compiled by Wells and Coppersmith 
(1994). As may be observed from these comparisons, the average and maximum 
displacements are slightly larger, but very close to, the best fit line of the global fault data. 
The displacement on the Greendale fault during the Darfield earthquake was dominated by 
dextral (right lateral) movement (Figure 2.4). Vertical offsets of up to ~1m occur at 
constraining or releasing bends. Oblique east-side down slip on the NW-striking western 
portion of the fault resulted in partial diversion of the Hororata River. The gross morphology 
of the fault is that of a series of E-W striking, NE-stepping surface traces that in detail consist 
of ESE-trending Riedel fractures with right-lateral displacements, SE-trending extensional 
fractures, SSE- to S-trending Riedel' fractures with left-lateral displacements, and NE-
striking thrusts and folds. Offsets as small as 1-5 cm were able to be mapped due to the 
numerous straight features (e.g., roads, fences) crossing the fault. As a consequence, the 
Greendale fault surface rupture length (SRL) has been measured to a high level of 
confidence. However, when the SRL is plotted against Moment Magnitude (Mw), and 
compared to global fault data (Figure 2.5), the Greendale SRL seems remarkably short for an 
earthquake of Mw 7.1. This is likely because much of the fault rupture occurred beneath the 
surface without any clear surface topographic expression. An ENE trending, ≥6 km long line 
of broken fences and roads ~2km south of Prebbleton indicates that the rupture process may 
have been complex and involved additional faults; this hypothesis is currently being tested 
with further geological mapping and shallow crustal geophysics. The eastern end of the fault 
north of Rolleston is undergoing slow creep at the surface, suggesting that the subsurface 
extent of the Greendale Fault rupture may extend further to the east then the mapped surface 
rupture. There is no seismological evidence to support the continuation of the fault into 
Christchurch City and post-earthquake creep along faults is an expected and well documented 
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phenomenon. Ongoing research and mapping of deformation throughout the region will 
provide additional constraints on the spatial pattern of surface rupture. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Comparisons of average (left) and maximum (right) surface rupture displacements 
for the Darfield earthquake with global fault data compiled by Wells and Coppersmith (1994) 
(global fault data courtesy of Don Wells) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Photographs of surface fault rupture on the Greendale fault (left photo: 
http://daveslandslideblog.blogspot.com/2010/09/images-of-darfield-canterbury.html). 
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Figure 2.5 Comparison of surface rupture length (SRL) for the Darfield earthquake with 
global fault data compiled by Wells and Coppersmith (1994) (global fault data courtesy of 
Don Wells) 
 
 
History of the Greendale fault  
Given the E-W strike of the Greendale Fault, it is very likely that this fault first formed 
during crustal extension more than 50 to 60 million years ago, when the shape of New 
Zealand (aka Zealandia) was much different from today. The Greendale Fault ruptured 
primarily across alluvial plains of the ‘Burnham’ surface, abandoned by rivers at the end of 
the Last Glaciation (Forsyth et al. 2008). No evidence of previous faulting had been 
recognized, either prior to the earthquake or in retrospective examination of pre-earthquake 
aerial photographs. However, thorough cultivation of the Canterbury Plains following the 
arrival of Europeans in the mid 1800s has subdued some detail of the original river channel 
form. Vertical offset along much of the new fault trace was minimal, given the strike-slip 
dominated movement, and it is probable that previous earthquakes had small vertical-to-
lateral displacements that would have evolved with time into isolated small hills that would 
not be easily recognizable as fault scarps. It is also possible that previous earthquakes did not 
produce surface rupture, as was the case for the 2010 Mw 7.0 Haiti earthquake, which shows 
no evidence for faulting at the surface. For these reasons, it is important to be cautious when 
drawing conclusions on the long term earthquake history of the Greendale Fault based on 
aerial photographs. Future research into ‘paleo-liquefaction’ features and fault trenching will 
hopefully yield datasets relevant to understanding the long-term history of this fault. Other, 
possibly analogous faults (e.g., Bobby’s Creek Fault, Ashley Fault) have Holocene 
earthquake recurrence intervals ranging from 1000-4000 yrs. 
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Geomorphology of Soil Deposits in the Christchurch Area  
The Canterbury Plains, about 160 km long and of varying width, are New Zealand’s largest 
areas of flat land. They have been formed by the overlapping fans of glacier-fed rivers issuing 
from the Southern Alps, the mountain range of the South Island. The plains are often 
described as fertile, but the soils are variable. Most are derived from the greywacke of the 
mountains or from loess (fine sediment blown from riverbeds). In addition, clay and volcanic 
rock are present near Christchurch from the Port Hills slopes of Banks Peninsula.  
The city of Christchurch is located at the coast of the Canterbury Plains adjacent to an extinct 
volcanic complex forming Banks Peninsula. Most of the city was mainly swamp, behind 
beach dune sand, and estuaries and lagoons, which have now been drained (Brown et al., 
1995). The two main rivers, Avon and Heathcote, which originate from springs in western 
Christchurch, meander through the city and act as main drainage system. The Waimakariri 
River with its catchment in the Southern Alps, regularly flooded Christchurch prior to 
stopbank construction and river realignment, which began shortly after the city was 
established in 1850.  
Of particular relevance to the liquefaction and lateral spreading that occurred during the 
Darfield earthquake are the locations of the abandoned/old river channels of the Waimakariri 
River. The area surrounding Kaiapoi as it exists today is shown in Figure 2.6. The main 
branch of the Waimakariri River flows from the west to the east, curving northwards as it 
passes beneath the town of Kaiapoi. A network of stop banks has been constructed to 
constrain the flow of this river along this route. The Kaiapoi River runs through the centre of 
Kaiapoi and is a tributary to the Waimakariri River. However, as discussed below, the 
Kaiapoi River used to be a branch of the Waimakariri River.   
 
 
Figure 2.6  Kaiapoi and vicinity, present day (Google Inc. 2010) 
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The area shown in Figure 2.6 is also shown in Figure 2.7, as it existed in 1935. The 
differences in the river channels from 1935 and the present have been highlighted. The red 
dashed line represents the current position of the Waimakariri River, showing that there has 
been little movement between 1935 and today. However, two differences in the locations of 
the river channels are highlighted in red and green in Figure 2.7. The red zone highlights an 
old river bed that is south of the Waimakariri River and that runs in a north-easterly direction, 
connecting to the Waimakariri River. A man-made channel diverts the flow of the 
Waimakariri River from the old bed. The green shaded region highlights the course of the old 
north branch of the Waimakariri River that used to flow around the western side of Kaiapoi, 
joining up with the present day Kaiapoi River in the centre of town. Finally, at the mouth of 
the Waimakariri River, the differences in sand bar characteristics in 1935 and today are 
highlighted in blue. Today the Waimakariri River empties into the ocean north of where it did 
in 1935, with sand bars extending from both the north and the south in 1935.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7 Kaiapoi and vicinity, 1935 (Image from Christchurch City Libraries; Shell NZ, 
1935) 
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Figure 2.8 shows the region circa 1865. To the left of the figure, it can be seen that the 
Waimakariri River split into two branches, the south and north branches shaded in red and 
green, respectively. Compare the current position of the Waimakariri River, denoted by the 
dashed red line, with the location of the two branches in 1865. Most notably, the confluence 
of the present-day Kaiapoi River and the south branch of the Waimakariri River was much 
closer to the Kaiapoi town centre in 1865. Also, the present day South Kaiapoi is located on 
what was then known as Kaiapoi Island. Finally, the mouth of the Waimakariri River is again 
highlighted in blue, with the northerly and southerly projecting sandbars being similar to 
those shown in Figure 2.7. 
 
 
 
 
       
Figure 2.8 Kaiapoi and vicinity, 1865 (Ward & Reeves, 1865) 
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The 1865 position of the south branch of the Waimakariri River is superimposed onto the 
present day map of the region in Figure 2.9. The old channel covers a large area on the 
eastern side of South Kaiapoi, coming from the south along the present-day railway line. 
South of the present-day Waimakariri River, the old channel covers a large part of the Coutts 
Island area on both sides of State Highway 1, extending west across farms and golf courses 
on the landside of the present day stopbanks. The implications of the location of the old river 
channel on the observed liquefaction and lateral spreading that occurred during Darfield 
Earthquake are discussed in subsequent chapters.   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.9 Present day Kaiapoi with position of 1865 river channel highlighted in red 
(Google Inc.  2010) 
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3. SEISMOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
Regional seismicity and historical earthquakes 
New Zealand straddles the boundary of the Australian and Pacific plates, where relative plate 
motion is obliquely convergent across the plate boundary at about 50 mm/yr in the north of 
the country, 40 mm/yr in the centre, and 30 mm/yr in the south (DeMets et al. 1994).  The 
complex faulting associated with the changing orientation of the subduction zones in the 
northeast and southwest, causes predominantly dextral faulting through the axial tectonic  
belt in the centre of the country.   
As a result of this complex faulting, New Zealand is a region of distributed seismicity, in that 
the relative movement of the Australian and Pacific plates are not accommodated by one or 
two faults in a narrow zone, but by many faults across a much wider zone (the axial tectonic 
belt).  It is therefore not surprising to observe that both large historical earthquakes (Figure 
3.1a), and recent seismicity (Figure 3.1b) can occur in almost any region in New Zealand. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 (a) Historical large earthquakes in New Zealand 
(http://sylph.gns.cri.nz/what/earthact/earthquakes/historic.html); and (b) shallow seismicity in 
the last ten years. (http://www.geonet.org.nz/earthquake/) . 
  15
The 4 September 2010 Mw 7.1 Darfield Earthquake 
The Mw7.1 Darfield earthquake occurred at 4:35am local time on the 4 September 2010.  The 
epicentre was located at 43.55˚S, 172.18˚E, approximately 40 km to the west of Christchurch, 
and about 80-90 km to the south and east of the current expression of the Australia - Pacific 
plate boundary through the island (the Alpine and Hope Faults).  The faulting, on the newly-
named Greendale fault, was initially thought to be primarily dextral strike slip movement (as 
noted by both United States Geological Survey, USGS, and Earthquake Research Institute, 
ERI), with also some oblique reverse faulting 
(http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/recenteqsww/Quakes/us2010atbj.php#summary). 
However, GNS Science now believes the faulting to be of primarily a reverse mechanism 
(http://www.geonet.org.nz/news/article-sep-4-2010-christchurch-earthquake.html).  Because 
the Canterbury plains are covered with river gravels, the surface expression of the Greendale 
fault was not apparent, and therefore, its existence was unknown to earthquake geologists 
prior to the event. 
 
Finite fault models 
Finite fault models for the Darfield earthquake have been developed by several different 
organizations.  Two publicly available inversions from USGS and ERI are shown in Figure 
3.2 and Figure 3.3.  Given that finite fault inversions are ill-conditioned, as expected, there 
are some differences between the models. However, both models illustrate that the nucleation 
point was approximately at the centre of the ruptured fault plane.  The resulting bi-lateral 
rupture therefore would have resulted in notably shorter duration of intense ground shaking at 
various locations, than would have occurred if the fault had have ruptured in a uni-lateral  
 
Figure 3.2 Finite fault inversion from Gavin Haynes (USGS) 
(http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews/2010/us2010atbj/finite_fault.php)  
  16
 
Figure 3.3 Finite fault inversion from ERI 
(http://outreach.eri.u-tokyo.ac.jp/2010/09/201009_nz_eng/) 
 
fashion.  Both finite fault models also indicate one large asperity of high slip to the west of 
the epicentre.  This is likely to have resulted in forward directivity effects observed in ground 
motions to the west of the fault, and backward directivity effects to the east of the fault (i.e. 
Christchurch). 
 
Rupture dimensions and aftershocks 
Geologists initially mapped the surface trace of the Greendale fault as 22km, but further work 
has found that now there is 29km surface expression.  As indicated by the finite fault models 
discussed in the previous chapter, the length of the fault rupture at depth is likely to be on the 
order of 40km.   
There have been numerous aftershocks recorded since the Mw7.1 mainshock.  Figure 3.4 
illustrates that the temporal occurrence of aftershocks has been in line with statistical 
predictions.   
Figure 3.5 illustrates the distribution of earthquakes observed in the Canterbury region over 
the period 24 July – 24 September, which are primarily the result of the Mw7.1 mainshock 
and its aftershocks.  It can be seen that the Mw7.1 mainshock has triggered many aftershocks 
on the edges of the Greendale fault, but also on many smaller faults in the general region.  
Although there is some speculation, it is generally considered that the occurrence of the 
Mw7.1 mainshock will result in little stress transfer effects to the primary faults in the axial 
tectonic belt (such as the Alpine fault). 
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Figure 3.4 Number of aftershocks with: (a) magnitude greater than 5; and (b) magnitude 
between 4 and 5, in comparison with statistical aftershock models  
(http://www.geonet.org.nz/news/sep-2010-darfield-earthquake/gns-science-response.html). 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Location of earthquakes in the Canterbury region over the period 25 July – 24 
September 2010 (i.e. primarily the mainshock and its aftershocks).  
(http://images.geonet.org.nz/maps/quakes/262-christchurch-quake.jpg)  
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Ground motion shaking 
The ground motion shaking as a result of the mainshock was widely felt in the Canterbury 
region, and in New Zealand in general.  Figure 3.6 illustrates the distribution of “felt-it” 
reports that were submitted online by the public.  Figure 3.7 illustrates the USGS ShakeMap, 
which utilizes both predictive models of MMI, and also the publicly submitted “felt-it” 
report.  It can be seen that MMI VIII-IX was observed in Darfield and Rolleston townships, 
and that the wider Christchurch region generally experienced MMI VI-VII. 
Numerous people and authorities have contrasted the Darfield earthquake with the Haiti 
earthquake as an illustration of how adequate building standards and preparedness can lead to 
a large difference in damage and casualties.  However, comparison of MMI’s observed to 
population exposures in Canterbury and Haiti dictates that caution should be made in such an 
interpretation (http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/07/in-earthquakes-poverty-
population-and-motion-matter/).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Locations of “felt-it” reports submitted online, there were 6897 reports as of 24 
September 2010 (http://www.geonet.org.nz/earthquake/quakes/3366146g-shaking.html)  
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Figure 3.7 USGS ShakeMap from the Mw7.1 mainshock 
(http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/shakemap/global/shake/2010atbj/).  
 
The Canterbury region is well instrumented with seismographs that can record strong ground 
motion.  Figure 3.8 illustrates the (vector-maximum) peak ground accelerations that were 
recorded throughout the region.  In the near source region, it can be seen that there are five 
recordings above 0.7g (although many of these peaks are in the vertical component).  The 
maximum 1.25g recorded at the Greendale station has also been deemed to have been 
contaminated by falling debris in the house garage in which the seismograph is installed (J. 
Zhao, personal communication). 
Using a wavelet decomposition procedure (Chanerley and Alexander, 2010) and integrating 
the Greendale record with and without the anomalous vertical peak at 35 seconds, Andrew 
Chanerley (pers comm.) finds that the horizontal velocities and displacements (x-displ. = -
163.1cm;  y-displ. =  -45.86cm) are little affected, with the vertical integrated displacement 
ranging from  -60.47cm to -66.46cm.   This result suggests that falling debris-induced 
acceleration spikes will have little effect on structural response computations (themselves 
integration processes).  Further, the integrated permanent "fling" displacements are consistent 
with the field observations of 3-4 m offset (2 x 1.63m = 3.26m). 
  20
 
 
Figure 3.8 Vector-maximum peak ground accelerations observed in the Canterbury region 
from strong motion seismometers (http://www.geonet.org.nz/news/sep-2010-darfield-
earthquake/gns-science-response.html).  
 
Figure 3.9 illustrates a preliminary comparison between the attenuation of ground motion 
intensity with source-to-site distance.  The comparison is preliminary in that, as previously 
mentioned, many details of the fault rupture (i.e. the fault plane and faulting mechanism) 
have not been finalised.  Acceleration Spectrum Intensity (ASI), defined as the integral of the 
pseudospectral acceleration of a ground motion from 0.1 to 0.5 sec (Von Thun et al. 1988), 
shown in Figure 3.9a illustrates somewhat of a high-frequency average of a ground motion, 
while Spectrum Intensity (SI), defined as the integral of pseudospectral velocity of a ground 
motion from 0.1 to 2.5 sec (Housner 1952), shown in Figure 3.9b illustrates a moderate 
frequency average of a ground motion.  It can be seen that the ground motions from this event 
by and large conform to predictions from empirical ground motion prediction equations.  
There is however clearly variability in the motion amplitudes that occur as a result of near-
source effects, topography and basin effects, and near-surface nonlinearities in the soft glacial 
deposited soils that underlie the Christchurch region.  
  21
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Figure 3.9 Observations of ground motion intensity compared with empirical prediction 
equations. The predictive relation for ASI and SI are a NZ-specific modification of the Chiou 
and Youngs (2008) model (Brendon Bradley, pers. comm.) 
 
Figure 3.10, Figure 3.11, and Figure 3.12 illustrate the recorded acceleration time histories 
and respective response spectra at the Greendale, Christchurch hospital, and Kaiapoi strong-
motion stations.  Also shown for reference are the predicted response spectra from ground 
motion prediction equations (Brendon Bradley, pers. comm.). Locations of these 
seismographs can be found at: http://www.geonet.org.nz/resources/network/netmap.html. 
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The Greendale seismograph was located almost directly over the fault plane and recorded the 
strongest ground motion from the mainshock.  It can be seen from the horizontal components 
of the ground motion that cyclic mobility in surficial soil layers may have occurred during the 
strong ground shaking. The occurrence of cyclic mobility is indicated by the high frequency 
spikes in the later half of the strong motion record. The spectral accelerations for this set of 
ground motion records are in line with empirical predictions.   
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Figure 3.10 (a) Acceleration time-histories; and (b) response spectra at Greendale 
seismograph. (Note that "Horiz gm" is the geometric mean of the two horiziontal components 
of motion.) 
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The Christchurch hospital seismograph is located near the centre of Christchurch.  The 
response spectra from this station clearly illustrate the significance of basin effects on the 
spectral amplitudes at 2-3 second vibration periods. Additionally, the spectral peak at 0.3-0.5 
seconds is likely due to the near-surface sediments which were rapidly deposited in the post-
glacial period. 
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Figure 3.11 (a) Acceleration time-histories; and (b) response spectra at Christchurch hospital 
seismograph. (Note that "Horiz gm" is the geometric mean of the two horiziontal components 
of motion.) 
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The Kaiapoi seismometer is located in the town of Kaiapoi, which experienced substantial 
liquefaction and lateral spreading.  It can be seen that the ground motions observed are 
generally well above those predicted by empirical models, indicating the importance of near 
surface sediments on site amplification. 
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Figure 3.12 (a) Acceleration time-histories; and (b) response spectra at Kaiapoi seismograph. 
(Note that "Horiz gm" is the geometric mean of the two horizontal components of motion.) 
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4. LIQUEFACTION AND LATERAL SPREADING 
In the 2010 Darfield Earthquake widespread liquefaction and lateral spreading occurred in 
various parts of Christchurch City (most extensively in the suburbs to the east of the city 
centre, but also in more localised areas to the north and southwest of the city), the town of 
Kaiapoi and the beachside settlements near the Waimakariri River. The liquefaction and 
associated ground deformation/failure led to significant damage to residential houses and 
lifeline systems. Particularly heavy damage was induced by lateral spreading, which was very 
extensive and severe in areas of South Kaiapoi (Courtenay Dr), and very severe but localized 
in some areas of Bexley, Spencerville and North Kaiapoi. Along the meandering loops of the 
Avon River in Avonside and Dallington, post-liquefaction settlement and lateral spreading 
was widespread, but lateral displacements were relatively moderate. Loose to very loose 
alluvial fine- to silty sand deposits in areas of old (abandoned) river channels, lagoons, 
wetlands and near waterways (streams, rivers) were responsible for the widespread 
liquefaction, lateral spreading and ground failures. In view of the extensiveness and severity 
of the effects, one may argue that the most significant engineering aspects of the 2010 
Darfield Earthquake were geotechnical in nature, with liquefaction and lateral spreading 
being the principal culprits for the inflicted damage. 
The observations made by the NZ-GEER reconnaissance team in these areas are briefly 
described below. The surveys were performed on foot, by car and from a helicopter over a 
period of six days. A broad-brush field reconnaissance was conducted in the first two days, 
followed by pin-point investigations at specific locations including detailed site inspections 
and field testing using: Dynamic Cone Penetration Test (DCPT), Swedish Weight Sounding 
(SWS), and Spectral Analysis of Surface Waves (SASW). Both DCPT and SWS results 
correlate to the Standard Penetration Test (SPT) N-values, and the SASW provides the shear 
wave velocity profiles. The observations from these inspections/in situ tests are also detailed 
below. Figure 4.1 shows the area of interest and some of the localities. 
 
Christchurch 
Christchurch is situated in the middle part of the east coast of South Island. It has a 
population of about 350,000 (the second largest city in New Zealand) and an urban area that 
covers approximately 450 km2. It is sparsely developed with approximately 150,000 
dwellings (predominantly single-storey houses with a smaller number of two-storey houses) 
spread across a large area with many parks, natural reserves and recreation grounds. The 
Central Business District (CBD) is more densely developed with multi-storey buildings and a 
relatively large number of historic buildings. The epicentre of the 2010 Darfield Earthquake 
was located approximately 40 km west of the Christchurch CBD. 
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Figure 4.1 Canterbury region, CBD and eastern suburbs of Christchurch (Google Inc. 2010)  
 
 
CBD 
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Local geology and liquefaction hazard 
The city of Christchurch is located on Holocene deposits of the Canterbury Plains, except for 
its southern edge, which is located on the slopes of the Port Hills of Banks Peninsula. The 
river floodplain and the loess sediments of the Port Hills are the dominant geomorphic 
features of the Christchurch urban area. 
The Canterbury Plains are complex fans deposited by eastward-flowing rivers from the 
Southern Alps to the Pegasus Bay coast. The fan surfaces cover an area 50-km wide by 160-
km long. At Christchurch, surface postglacial sediments have a thickness between 15 and 40 
m and overlie 300-400 m thick inter-layered gravelly formations (Brown and Webber, 1992). 
The surface sediments are either fluvial gravels, sands and silts (Springston formation, with a 
maximum thickness of 20 m to the west of Christchurch) or estuarine, lagoon, beach, and 
coastal swamp deposits of sand, silt, clay and peat (Christchurch formation, with a maximum 
thickness of 40 m at New Brighton coast, east of CBD). The soil deposits at relatively 
shallow depths of up to 15-20 m vary significantly within short distances, both horizontally 
and vertically. 
Brown and Webber (1992) describe the original site conditions and development of 
Christchurch as follows: “Originally the site of Christchurch was mainly swamp lying behind 
beach dune sand; estuaries and lagoons, and gravel, sand and silt of river channel and flood 
deposits of the coastal Waimakariri River flood plain. The Waimakariri River regularly 
flooded Christchurch prior to stopbank construction and river realignment. Since European 
settlement in the 1850s, extensive drainage and infilling of swamps has been undertaken.” 
Brown and Webber also state that surface deposits are actively accumulating and that the 
present day river channel deposits are excluded from the above-mentioned Christchurch and 
Springston formations. 
Canterbury has an abundant water supply through open-channels (rivers, streams) and very 
rich aquifers. The dominant features of present day Christchurch are the Avon and Heathcote 
rivers that originate from springs in western Christchurch, meander through the city, and feed 
the estuary at the southeast end of the city. The ground water table is deepest at the west end 
of the city (at about 5 m depth), gradually increases towards east, and approaches the ground 
surface near the coastline. The water table is within 1.0-1.5 m of the ground surface for most 
of the city east of the CBD. 
The high liquefaction hazard in Christchurch was known prior to the earthquake, as 
illustrated by the liquefaction hazard map (Figure 4.2) and information provided by the 
Environment Canterbury (ECan: http://ecan.govt.nz/publications/General/solid-facts-
christchurch-liquefaction.pdf) to residents, based on a study from 2004. 
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Figure 4.2 High ground-water table liquefaction potential hazard map for Christchurch 
(http://ecan.govt.nz/publications/General/solid-facts-christchurch-liquefaction.pdf; pre-event 
information provided to residents and public by ECan)  
 
 
Liquefaction manifestation during the Darfield earthquake  
The Darfield earthquake caused widespread liquefaction in the eastern suburbs of 
Christchurch along the Avon River, particularly in Avonside, Dallington, Burwood and 
Bexley. Other suburbs, particularly to the east and northeast of CBD, were also affected by 
liquefaction, but to a lesser extent. Widespread liquefaction also occurred in Halswell, at the 
southwest end of the city. Pockets of limited or partial liquefaction were observed in various 
parts of Christchurch, though these were much fewer to the west of CBD. Figure 4.3 shows 
areas of observed liquefaction in the urban area of Christchurch based on surface 
manifestation of liquefaction visible in aerial photographs and initial observations from 
ground surveying. The areas most severely affected by liquefaction were close to waterways 
(rivers, streams, swamps). The effects of liquefaction were often localized and changed 
substantially over a relatively short distance (50-100 m) from very severe to low or no 
manifestation of liquefaction.   
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Figure 4.3 Areas of observed liquefaction (red shaded regions and red points) in Christchurch 
due to the 2010 Darfield earthquake (the liquefaction map is based on surface manifestation 
of liquefaction visible in aerial photographs and compiled evidence from ground surveying)   
 
 
Avonside and Dallington 
Widespread liquefaction occurred in Avonside and Dallington, particularly in the areas 
enclosed within the meandering loops of the Avon River. In these areas, the extensive 
liquefaction was accompanied by a complex pattern of lateral spreading. Large sand boils 
adjacent to houses and silty-sand and water covering the streets indicated extensive 
liquefaction in this area. Ground cracks with complex patterns indicated either lateral 
spreading features and/or ground distortion due to liquefaction including bearing failures. A 
large number of residential houses settled, tilted and suffered structural/foundation damage. 
Typical manifestation of liquefaction in the backyard of a residential property is shown in 
Figure 4.4 (Bracken St, Avonside). Sand boil ejecta covered most of the lawn and was about 
20 cm thick in places. There was evidence of massive liquefaction and large surface 
distortion on Bracken St. The potable water and sewer systems were out of service at the time 
of the inspections. Despite significant amounts of liquefaction ejecta and broken utilities 
throughout the neighbourhood, the house shown in the pictures suffered minor damage in 
terms of differential settlement and cracking. 
Avonside 
Bexley 
Dallington 
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(a) Massive sand boils in residential area of Avonside (Bracken St) 
 
    
(b) The sand boil (grey non-plastic silty sand) in the bottom half of the photo to the left was 
typical of many locations across Christchurch and Kaiapoi where massive liquefaction was 
observed; at this location, a brown silty sand was also found on the ground surface (upper 
half of the sand boil); photo to the right: University of Canterbury postgraduate students 
perform Swedish Weight Sounding (SWS) test (Bracken St) 
 
Figure 4.4 Evidence of extensive liquefaction in residential areas of Avonside 
 
 
The geotechnical reconnaissance team performed a detailed survey at St Paul’s Church 
(Gayhurst Rd, Dallington) which suffered damage due to liquefaction in the foundation soils 
(Chapter 5). Figure 4.5 shows a complex pattern of ground distortion including large cracks 
and vertical offsets around the building. Extensive sand boils covered the paved area around 
the building, backyard lawn, and around the perimeter of the building and its foundations. 
The building suffered large differential settlements and severe structural damage. 
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(a) Bearing failure in liquefied soils (St Paul’s Church, Dallington); the crack is 50-90 cm 
wide with a vertical offset of 33 cm, at its maximum  
      
(b) Evidence of liquefaction in foundation soils resulting in large total and differential 
settlements   
 
Figure 4.5 Liquefaction-induced bearing failure in Dallington (St Paul’s Church, Gayhurst 
Rd) 
Specifically, the northwest side of the building was ripped in half due to a combination of 
differential settlement and lateral movement. This site is centrally located in a meandering 
loop of the Avon River and bounded by the river on all sides at distances of about 150-250 m, 
except to the north/northeast.  There was apparent evidence of lateral spreading in this area, 
despite being located more than 150 m from the free-face of the river. (Note, however, that 
this distance is not necessarily anomalous. Evidence of lateral spreading has been found at 
distances of up to 2 km from a free-face in the New Madrid, Missouri, USA, area 
(Obermeier, S.F., per. comm.). These features manifested during the 1811-1812 earthquakes 
that occurred in that region.) The tension cracks and fissures around the building were much 
bigger than those near the river channel, and hence it is possible that they are not directly 
related only to the lateral spreading. Further investigations are required to clarify these 
details. 
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Ten days after the event, the team performed Swedish Weight Sounding (SWS) tests at 
Bracken St and in the backyard of St Paul’s Church. SWS is a simple manually operated 
penetration test under a dead-load of 100 kg in which the number of half-rotations required 
for a 25 cm penetration of a rod (screw point) is recorded (JIS, 1995). One of the advantages 
of the SWS test which was heavily utilized in this investigation is the ability to perform the 
test within a confined space in backyards of residential properties. Figure 4.6 shows the 
penetration resistance measured in the SWS tests conducted at Bracken St and St Paul’s 
Church, expressed in terms of the number of half-rotations per metre, NSW. Correlations exist 
to transfer this penetration resistance to an equivalent SPT N-value. However, the N-value 
correlations are not presented herein. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6 Post-event penetration resistance in Dallington (St Paul’s Church/School) and 
Avonside (Bracken St) measured in SWS tests 
 
Additionally, two Dynamic Cone Penetration Tests (DCPT) were performed at the residence 
shown in Figure 4.4, one in the backyard and one in the front yard. The results of the DCPTs 
are shown in Figure 4.7. At each of the test locations, a hand auger was used to bore a hole 
down to the layer that liquefied. This layer was identified by comparing ejecta material with 
soil extracted by the hand auger. Once at the liquefied layer, the DCPTs were performed until 
the blow count significantly increased or the team ran out of DCPT rods (i.e., ~4.6 m below 
the ground surface).  
There are several different configurations of the DCPT equipment available. The one used in 
these investigations was originally designed by Sowers and Hedges (1966) and built by 
Humboldt Manufacturing Co. This system utilizes a 6.8-kg mass (15-lb drop weight) on an E-
Soil profile symbols:            sandy               silty                with gravel 
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rod slide drive to penetrate an oversized 45° apex angle cone. The cone is oversized to act as 
a friction reducer for the rods. The DCPT blow count is the number of drops of the weight 
required to drive the cone ~4.5 cm.   
The ground water table at both sounding locations at the Bracken Dr residence was at ~0.8m, 
and the top of the liquefiable layer was at a depth of ~2.1 to 2.4 m. The strata overlying the 
liquefiable layer were clayey. For one of the tests, the DCPT rods sank under their own 
weight 20+ cm, indicating very loose sand. Because no samples are recovered with the 
DCPT, the thickness of the liquefied sand layer cannot be determined for certain. However, 
from looking at the results shown in Figure 4.7, the penetration resistance sharply increases at 
a depth of ~3.5 m. Additionally, there is a very wet, very soft, thin (~10 to 15 cm) clay/plastic 
silt layer that overlies the liquefied layer. It is unknown whether this is a very sensitive 
material that softens as a result of earthquake shaking and/or sampling or whether it is a result 
of a water film that formed between the liquefied layer and clay layer. 
  
            
Figure 4.7. Results of DCPT performed at a residence on Bracken St, Avonside. 
 
A DCPT and SASW test were also performed at St Paul's Church. The results of these tests 
are shown in Figure 4.8. Based on the bore hole augered for the DCPT test, the water table 
was at a depth of about 2.3 m and the top of the liquefied layer was at a depth of about 2.8 m. 
The SASW test was performed approximately 20 m away from the DCPT location. 
The nonintrusive SASW (Spectral Analysis of Surface Waves) method is a common 
procedure used for obtaining shear wave velocity (Vs) profiles for liquefaction analyses  
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Figure 4.8. Results of DCPT and SASW tests performed at St Paul's Church in Dallington. 
 
(Stokoe et al. 1994, Andrus and Stokoe 2000, Youd et al. 2001). The SASW method is 
particularly well-suited for relatively shallow surveys conducted in areas with limited space 
where conventional multi-channel (MASW) arrays may not fit. Furthermore, the equipment 
used for the tests discussed herein is extremely light-weight and portable, and can be 
transported in a small backpack, which makes it ideal for earthquake reconnaissance work.  
Specifically, these SASW tests were conducted using three 4.5-Hz geophones and a ‘pocket 
portable’ dynamic signal analyzer (Quattro system) manufactured by Data Physics 
Corporation. The Quattro is USB-powered off a laptop and, despite its small size, has four 
input channels, two output channels, 205 kHz simultaneous sampling rate, 24 bit ADC’s, 110 
dB dynamic range, and 100 dB anti-alias filters. A common 4- to 6-kg sledge hammer can 
typically be used as a dynamic source to profile approximately 6- to 10-m deep with this 
equipment in less than 15 minutes. 
The Vs profiles must be corrected for overburden pressure (Vs1) prior to evaluating soil 
liquefaction triggering.  Generally speaking, even without this correction any soil layers with 
Vs less than 150 m/s are quite soft and may be potentially liquefiable. However, it will be 
noted that Vs measurements alone cannot definitively determine liquefaction susceptibility, 
as the type of soil (i.e. clay or sand), not just its stiffness/velocity, is a key factor. The Vs 
profile shown in Figure 4.8 indicates soft soils down to 8 m depth, with the softest soils 
between approximately 2-4 m. 
 
 
36 
 
Further to the east of Dallington, extensive liquefaction, including substantial lateral 
spreading, was observed in Porritt Park (Wainoni), which is enclosed by the Avon River and 
a diverted stream around the park. Large sand boils covered substantial areas of the park 
(Figure 4.9). Parallel cracks spaced regularly along drainage lines were indicative of 
slumping and spreading towards the north and south branches of the stream. A couple of 
hockey fields located in the park were severely damaged by the liquefaction, resulting in a 
very uneven, bumpy surface of the fields. 
 
 
(a) Aerial view: massive sand boils with large number of parallel cracks along drainage lines 
(from a helicopter flyover on the afternoon of Friday September 10) 
 
(b) ∼ 10 cm wide lateral spread crack   
Figure 4.9 Massive sand boils and lateral spreading cracks at Porritt Park (43.516278°S, 
172.689917°E) 
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Bexley 
Bexley is located further to the east along the Avon River, approximately one kilometre from 
the Avon-Heathcote Estuary. It is bounded by the Avon River on the east-side and by the 
Bexley Wetland on the south (Figure 4.10a). The residential area was developed in several 
stages, with the southern portion being reclaimed from the wetlands and developed in the late 
1990s and later on. 
Widespread liquefaction occurred in Bexley, affecting a large number of residential houses 
(Figure 4.10). Ground distortion (i.e., differential settlement, large ground cracks, 
deformation of paved surfaces and substantial sand boils) was observed at Seabreeze St and 
Kokopu Ln. Residential properties along the southern edge of Bexley (along the wetland 
walkway) were severely affected by lateral spreading.  Large movement of the walkway 
towards the water, slumping of the terrace fill and large ground cracks on residential 
properties were observed in this area. Similarly, severe manifestation of lateral spreading was 
observed at the east end of Bexley (Parenga Pl). 
 
        
(a) Aerial view of the southern edge of Bexley which was severely affected by liquefaction 
and lateral spreading; (b) Evidence of liquefaction in residential area (Seabreeze St) 
                      
(c) Large ground cracks due to lateral spreading at Kokopu Pl; (d) Cracks in unreinforced 
slab induced by lateral spreading 
Figure 4.10 Evidence of extensive liquefaction severely affecting residential houses in Bexley 
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An SWS test, DCPT, and SASW test were performed in the backyard of a house in Bexley; 
the results are shown in Figure 4.11. Based on the bore hole augered for the DCPT test, the 
ground water table was at a depth of ~1.5 m and the top of the liquefied layer was at a depth 
of ~1.6 m. The SASW test was performed ~10 m away from the DCPT sounding. 
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Figure 4.11 Results of SWS test, DCPT, and SASW test performed in the backyard of a 
house in Bexley. 
 
 
Liquefaction manifestation in other areas of Christchurch 
Widespread liquefaction also occurred in the suburbs of Halswell (southwest of Christchurch) 
and Brooklands (northeast of Christchurch). In Spencerville (also north-east of Christchurch), 
liquefaction occurred and lateral spreading affected a limited area. In these suburbs, the 
manifestation of liquefaction and its effects on residential houses and lifeline systems were 
similar to those previously described. Again, the severity of liquefaction and associated 
building damage varied even within a given neighbourhood, depending on the soil profile, 
distance from the free face, slope grade, and/or structural and foundation details. 
Limited or partial liquefaction was observed at numerous locations across the city, which 
manifested as scattered and relatively small (or within limited area) sand boils. In these 
places there was damage to roads, footpaths, and driveways as well as some house damage, 
but the liquefaction effects were moderate or mild. Figure 4.12 shows typical manifestation 
of limited liquefaction in CBD (Peterborough St) and in the backyard of a power sub-station 
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on the Greers Rd in Bishopdale. Other areas where liquefaction of limited extent was 
observed include Belfast (Engelfield Rd, near Main North Rd), Redwood (Barnes Rd, near 
Main North Rd), Fendalton (Queens Av), vicinity of English Park in St Alban’s (Cranford St, 
Westminster St, Courtenay St, Trafalgar St, Sheppard St) and Burwood (DeVille Pl and 
DeBlog Pl). These areas of partial/limited liquefaction are shown in the liquefaction map in 
Figure 4.3. 
The geotechnical reconnaissance team also conducted a quick drive-through reconnaissance 
along the Heathcote River, specifically targeting areas that were denoted as having high-
potential for liquefaction-induced damage on the ECan liquefaction hazard maps 
(http://ecan.govt.nz/publications/General/solid-facts-christchurch-liquefaction.pdf). However, 
there was very little evidence of ground distortion and liquefaction in this area, with only a 
few sand boils found in a period of about two hours of drive-through and on foot surveys. 
 
 
      
(a) Evidence of liquefaction at Peterborough St - Madras St (CBD) ; (b) Sand boil in the 
foundation soils of a transmission tower (sub-station northeast of Greers Rd – Ruddenklau 
Ln, Bishopdale) (43.4928055°S, 172.5918055°E) 
Figure 4.12 Evidence of limited/partial liquefaction in areas of Christchurch 
 
 
Characteristics of liquefied soils 
The ejecta from sand boils in areas affected by liquefaction were generally very similar and 
had several distinctive features. They were non-plastic fine sands and silty sands with an 
easily recognizable grey/blue colour. 
Grain-size distribution curves of ejecta samples taken from Dallington (Gayhurst Rd), Porritt 
Park and South Kaiapoi (Courtenay Dr) are shown in Figure 4.13a. Figure 4.13b shows grain 
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size distribution of soil samples taken from the SWS screw point (representative of the 
deepest layer penetrated in a SWS test), which shows significantly higher fines content.  
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(a) Grain size distribution curves of sand boil samples obtained by laser diffraction analysis 
 
 
 
(b) Grain size distribution curves of soil samples taken from the SWS screw point (deepest 
tested layer) obtained by sieve and hydrometer analyses: Dallington (Nos. 2, 3), Bexley (Nos. 
4,6)  
Figure 4.13 Grain-size distribution curves of Christchurch and Kaiapoi soils 
 
Figure 4.14 shows the large sandboil from which a bulk sample of the sand was recovered. 
Featherstone Reserve at Pines Beach was the location (approximate position 43° 22’ 52” S 
172° 42’ 13” E). Figures 4.15-4.18 give electron micrographs of various fractions of the sand 
in relation to sieve size. The micrographs are all at the same magnification, 100 times, and 
show that the particles tend to be angular to subrounded in shape. As the particle size 
decreases the angularity of the particles increases. 
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Figure 4.14 Sandboil in the Featherstone Reserve Pines Beach from which sand was taken for 
electron microscope pictures 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.15 Sand particles passing the 45 micron sieve 
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Figure 4.16 Sand particles retained on the 63 micron sieve 
 
 
 
Figure 4.17 Sand particles retained on the 90 micron sieve 
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Figure 4.18 Sand particles retained on the 212 micron sieve 
 
 
Effects of liquefaction and lateral spreading on streambeds and wetlands 
Residents of the Bexley area commented on the effect of the earthquake on the Bexley 
Wetlands.  Figure 4.19 shows a view from walking path around the south of the subdivision. 
Many sand boils are seen in the bed of the wetland area (at high tide on 29 September) which 
was inundated at high tide prior to the earthquake. 
Stream beds were also noticed to be heaved (Figure 4.20). A local resident confirmed that 
this was not how the stream bed appeared prior to the earthquake. In some places it was 
necessary to clear the stream bed soon after the earthquake.  
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Figure 4.19 View of the Bexley Wetland at near high tide on Wednesday 29 September 2010. 
Prior to the earthquake this area was inundated at high tide. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.20 Photograph of the stream near Porritt Park on Wednesday, 15 September 2010. 
There is lateral spreading towards this stream from both sides. It is just possible to make out a 
sand boil in the midst of the stream bed debris to the right of the duck. Several other sand 
boils were visible along the stretch of heaved stream bed. 
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Google imaging as evidence of liquefaction 
A few hours after the earthquake, a GeoEye image of part of the area affected by the 
earthquake was captured. Since Saturday September 04 was a clear day, this image provided 
good evidence of liquefaction in some parts of the city. Figure 4.21 shows part of the GeoEye 
image covering Porritt Park (location about 43.515555°S, 172.685277°E; the image date is 3 
September 2010 because GMT, rather than the local time and date in Christchurch, is used by 
Google). Figure 4.9a shows a picture of Porritt Park taken from a helicopter on the afternoon 
of Friday, 10 September 2010. 
Comparison of these two images (Figs. 4.9a and 4.21), and also observations from on-ground 
reconnaissance, demonstrates that GeoEye is able to give good indication of liquefaction. Not 
surprisingly, it turns out that the key to this identification is contrast. The light colour of the 
ejected sand contrasts very well with the underlying green turf. In areas where the ejected 
sand covered the pavement, such as Bexley, the GeoEye image did not give such a clear 
indication of liquefaction. 
Local residents commented that on the morning after the earthquake the Avon and Heathcote 
rivers had a milky appearance. This is because the ejected sand contained enough fine 
material (typically 10 % finer than about 50 microns) to stay in suspension for some time 
when mixed with water. A GeoEye image of part of the Halswell area is shown in Figure 
4.22. Extrapolating from Figure 4.21, this figure suggests that there are some areas of 
Halswell where extensive liquefaction occurred. However, discussions with local residents 
revealed that a considerable volume of water came to the ground surface along with ejected 
sand, and this water took on a milky colour. So, the ejected sand could not be distinguished 
from the water in the satellite image. Some days after the earthquake this water had subsided.  
In conclusion, comparison of the GeoEye image with on-ground reconnaissance confirms 
that, provided there is enough colour contrast between the ejecta and the surrounding ground, 
the satellite image gives a useful indication of liquefaction. However, when large volumes of 
water are ejected with the sand there may be a false indication of the amount of ejecta 
present. 
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Figure 4.21 Image of Porritt Park extracted from the GeoEye image taken a few hours after 
the earthquake (Google Inc., 2010) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.22 Part of Halswell as imaged by GeoEye after the earthquake. The ejected sand is 
accompanied by considerable volumes of water forming mini-lakes having a similar colour to 
the ejected sand (Google Inc., 2010) 
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Town of Kaiapoi 
The town of Kaiapoi (population ~10,000; area ~5 km2) is situated about 17 km north of 
Christchurch, near the north-eastern end of the Canterbury Plains. At Kaiapoi, recent 
Holocene sediments, approximately 100 m thick, overlie 300-400 m of late Pleistocene sands 
and gravels, which in turn rest on rock and a greywacke basement rock (Brown and Webber, 
1992; Berrill et al., 1994). 
Present day Kaiapoi is divided into North Kaiapoi and South Kaiapoi by the Kaiapoi River 
(Figure 4.23). At the southeast end of Kaiapoi, the Waimakariri River meets the Kaiapoi 
River. The Waimakariri River and its abandoned channels significantly influenced 
liquefaction susceptibility of Kaiapoi. As discussed in the Geology chapter of this report and 
in Berrill et al. (1994), before 1868, the Waimakariri River had two branches. The north 
branch flowed in the channel of the present Kaiapoi River, and the south branch flowed in the 
now abandoned channel that was located between the present Kaiapoi River and Waimakariri 
River channels (Figure 2.9). Several old meander loops of pre-1868 Waimakariri River have 
deposited loose silty sands both north and south of the present Kaiapoi River. Also, the 
ground water table is generally shallow within 1-2 m of the ground surface. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.23 Map of present day Kaiapoi (Google Inc., 2010) 
Kaiapoi River 
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Parts of North Kaiapoi liquefied during the 1901 Cheviot Earthquake. Berrill et al. (1994) 
provide an excellent summary of the liquefaction that occurred in Kaiapoi during the 1901 
event. Particularly, they presented historical evidence of the occurrence of liquefaction in the 
northeast section of Kaiapoi, at the east end of Charles and Sewell streets. 
 
North Kaiapoi 
In the 2010 Darfield Earthquake, widespread liquefaction occurred north of the Kaiapoi River 
(Charles St, Sewell St, Cassia St) affecting a large number of residential houses.  The houses 
in this area are typically single- or two-storey brick/stone block masonry or timber structures 
on spread footings. Figure 4.24 shows areas of severe and moderate-to-low liquefaction in the 
town of Kaiapoi. A strong motion station located in north Kaiapoi recorded a PGA of 
approximately 0.32g (geometric mean of the horizontal components) during the earthquake. 
                                                         
 
 
Figure 4.24 Areas of observed liquefaction in the town of Kaiapoi due to the 2010 Darfield 
earthquake (the liquefaction map is based on surface manifestation of liquefaction visible on 
aerial photographs and compiled evidence from ground surveying)  
Waimakariri River 
Kaiapoi River 
NORTH KAIAPOI
SOUTH KAIAPOI 
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The liquefaction was particularly intense, producing massive sand boils of grey, silty sand, at 
Cassia Place and at the east end of Charles and Sewell streets. In the worst hit area, the silty 
sand ejecta was about 400 mm thick, as shown in Figure 4.25. Some residents reported 
geysers appearing in the backyard following the earthquake, often forming a small pond near 
the house that remained for several days after the event. An SWS test and DPTs were 
performed by the team in this area, with the SWS test indicating loose/soft soils up to depths 
of 8-9 m (Figure 4.26). 
 
      
(a) ~40 cm thick layer of silt-sand-water mixture covering a residential property affected by 
very severe liquefaction; (b) same-angle view, but after the clean up of sand boils 
 
    
(c) View from the street (before clean up); (d) liquefied silt-sand-water mixture covering the 
ground outside the house and a rug inside the house (seen through a window from inside the 
house)    
Figure 4.25 Manifestation of very severe liquefaction in residential area at Cass Pl, North 
Kaiapoi 
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Figure 4.26 Results of SWS test and DCPTs performed in the backyard of a house at Cassia 
Pl. 
As determined from the bore holes augered for the DCPTs, the depth to the ground water 
table and to the top of the liquefied layer differed between the two test locations at Cassia Pl 
although the test locations were only ~25 m apart. However, the surface elevation of the two 
test locations differed by about 0.5 m. As a result, the elevations of the ground water table are 
similar for the two test locations, with the depth to the top of the liquefied layer differing 
slightly. As with the site on Bracken St (Figure 4.4), a 10- to 15-cm thick, very wet, very soft 
clay/plastic silt layer overlies the liquefied layer. 
In this general area, including near the east end of Charles St and Sewell St, the liquefaction 
led to large settlement of many houses, including differential settlement that resulted in 
structural damage. The large ground distortion, cracks and fissures in the ground caused 
significant damage to buried lifelines in this area. The intensity of liquefaction gradually 
decreased from severe to moderate-to-mild and no liquefaction when moving away to the 
north or west from the Beswick St-Cass St-Askeaton Dr block. 
The area along the Pegasus Bay Walkway (from the Kaiapoi Visitor Information Centre on 
the east to Askeaton Park on the west) was affected by significant lateral spreading with large 
cracks and fissures in the sloping ground towards Charles St (Figure 4.27). Residential 
houses in this area were affected both by liquefaction and lateral spreading (Figure 4.28). The 
reconnaissance team carried out detailed ground surveys of lateral spreading along several 
profiles at this location which will be presented in further more detailed publications. In 
addition two bore holes were made using a hand auger. However, the profile largely consisted 
of random fill (gravels/cobbles and wood), making it difficult to advance the auger. One of 
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the bore holes went down to a depth of ~5.5 m, yet a thick liquefied layer could not be found. 
However, thin (< 10 cm) alternating layers of loose saturated sand and very wet, very soft 
clay/plastic silt were encountered, particularly near a large lateral spread crack (Figure 
4.27b). This lateral spread crack had no traces of ejecta in and/or immediately near it. This 
crack was closer to the river than ones that were filled with ejecta, which were an additional 
30 m further from the river. It is possible, that the overlying soil layers slid on these 
alternating layers of loose sand and clay/plastic silt that likely liquefied/softened during the 
earthquake shaking. 
 
(a) Lateral spread and slumping of the north stopbank of the Kaiapoi River near the east end 
of Charles St; note the huge piles of cleaned up sand obstructing the view of the houses 
                           
(b) Lateral spreading of the north stopbank of Kaiapoi River (Charles St – Jones St) 
Figure 4.27 Evidence of liquefaction and lateral spreading along Charles St and the north 
stopbank of the Kaiapoi River (43.384694°S, 172.660944°E) 
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(a) Evidence of extensive liquefaction at the east end of Charles St 
 
 
 
    
(b) Lateral spreading resulting in a large ground distortion in foundation soils (Charles St)   
 
Figure 4.28 Liquefaction and lateral spreading in North Kaiapoi  
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South Kaiapoi 
In South Kaiapoi, the most dominant ground failure feature was the liquefaction and massive 
lateral spreading that affected the eastern branch of Courtenay Drive. The area affected by 
lateral spreading, shown in Figure 4.29, was approximately 1-km long in the north-south 
direction and extended between 200 m and 300 m inland from the Courtenay Stream and 
Courtenay Lake. The lake was artificially created during the construction of the northern end 
of Courtenay Dr. Borrow material was removed from the area where the lake is presently 
located and used as hydraulic fill (about 1 m thick) for the northern branch of Courtenay Dr 
(WDC, 2010). 
 
 
(a) Sand boils and area affected by lateral spreading around Courtenay Lake (from a 
helicopter flyover on Friday September 10) 
       
(b) Large lateral spread cracks in farm land 
Figure 4.29 Massive lateral spreading at South Kaiapoi  
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The eastern edge of Kaiapoi is shown in aerial photographs taken after the Darfield 
earthquake (Figure 4.30).  The outline of the 1865 Waimakariri river channel (Figure 2.9) is 
shown by the dashed red line. On the eastern side of Kaiapoi, the old channel passes 
underneath the present day Courtenay Dr area shown as position 1, where severe damage to 
residential properties occurred due to lateral spreading (Figure 4.34). Further south at 
positions A and B (Figure 4.29), large cracks due to lateral spreading towards Courtenay 
 
 
Figure 4.30 Aerial view of the lateral spreading area at South Kaiapoi 
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Stream are evident. Along this stretch from position A to the north-east corner of Courtenay 
Dr (slightly north of position 1), detailed ground surveys were conducted along ten transects 
including measurement and mapping of width of cracks, vertical offsets, and geo-tagging of 
major cracks and other lateral spreading features. Figure 4.31 indicates geo-tagged major 
cracks and four transects of detailed measurements at position A. 
 
   
Figure 4.31 Aerial view of the lateral spreading area at position A at South Kaiapoi showing 
four transects of detailed ground surveys 
 
Further south near the train tracks at position 2 (Figure 4.30), large sand boils formed (Figure 
4.32). At position 3 (Figure 4.33), liquefaction resulted in damage to the train tracks.  The 
photo in Figure 4.33 was taken from a position on Doubleday’s Rd in a NNE direction along 
the tracks, indicating ground deformation and track movement. Moving north along the train 
tracks to positions 4 and A (Figure 4.30), Figure 4.31 provides a more detailed aerial view of 
liquefaction and lateral spreading crossing the tracks just south of Kaiapoi. Using the vehicles 
in the photo for scale gives a good indication of the significant size of these cracks and the 
volume of ejecta. 
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Figure 4.32 Sand boils in fields (position 2; 43.4026ºS, 172.6503ºE) 
 
 
Figure 4.33 Damage to train tracks due to ground movement (position 3; 43.4068ºS, 
172.6489ºE)  
 
Lateral spreading resulted in large permanent lateral displacements on the order of 1.0-3.5 m 
with large ground cracks of about 0.5-1.5 m wide running through residential properties and 
houses along the east branch of Courtenay Dr. In this area, single storey and two storey 
houses suffered very severe damage due to large lateral ground movements including large 
tilt, loss of foundation support, tension cracks in foundations and slabs (Figure 4.34). It was 
significant that despite the extreme lateral movement of the immediate foundation soils and 
the foundations themselves, all houses showed large ductile deformation capacity and 
continued to carry gravity loads, despite literally being ripped in half in some cases. The 
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reconnaissance team visited the area and conducted detailed inspections and measurements of 
the distorted houses on several occasions. There was clear evidence that the lateral 
movement, at least in some parts of the affected area, continued to develop/increase well after 
the main event. Two consecutive measurements of the width of a large ground crack carried 
out on 11 and 15 September showed an increase in width of 20 cm over this period ( i.e. from 
1.4 m to 1.6 m). The residents of the neighbouring property reported new extensive cracks 
appearing in their house over the same time period. It is believed that this continued 
deformation was the result of a combination of creep due to static driving shear stresses, 
significantly softened soils and effects of aftershocks on a structure marginally stable under 
gravity loads. 
An SASW test, DCPT and SWS test were performed at a home along Courtenay Dr. The 
results are presented in Figure 4.35.  
 
       
(a) Sand boils and lateral spread cracks   
       
(b) Effects of lateral spreading in residential area   
Figure 4.34 Lateral spreading at Courtenay Dr, South Kaiapoi  
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Figure 4.35 Results of SAWS test, DCPT and SWS test performed at a residential property 
along Courtenay Dr. 
 
Liquefaction associated with ejected gravel 
Selwyn River near Greendale 
The Selwyn River traverses the Canterbury Plains flowing in a roughly south-easterly 
direction to the south of Christchurch and discharging into Lake Ellesmere. 
At the evening meeting of Sunday, 12 September, Pilar Villamor of GNS reported to the team 
that she had seen liquefaction in a farm paddock at the Greendale end of the fault trace. The 
paddock was on the Selwyn Forks property which is accessed from the Hororata - Dunsandel 
Rd on the southern side of the Hororata and Selwyn rivers. The locations of the liquefaction 
are shown in Figure 4.36. 
The NZ-GEER team visited the area on Monday, 13 September. On the evening of Sunday, 
12 September, there had been heavy rain in the area, so on Monday the river channels were 
running high and the Hororata River was flowing in new areas because of a stopbank damage 
induced by the earthquake. The team first looked at end of Gillanders Rd. on the Darfield 
side, and found an area with ground damage off the end of the track, close to one of the river 
channels (Figure 4.37, Photo 1, BX22 257725 (43° 35’ 48” S 172° 04’ 48” E). 
A short distance from here at the end of Gillanders Rd, the team found damage to the 
unsealed pavement and in the grass verge nearby. Evidence of liquefaction was seen (Figure 
4.38, Photo 2, BX22 258726).  Notable here was the fine gravel on the surface of the sand. 
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Also note that rain had fallen the previous evening so the surface of the ejected material 
would have been altered somewhat. 
 
Selwyn Forks farm buildings
Photo 1 (BX22 257 727)
Photo 2 (BX22 258 727)
Photo 3 (BX22 252 728)
Photo 4 (BX22 249 729)
 
Figure 4.36 Location of the liquefaction along the Selwyn River in the Greendale region. 
(Date of Google image October 23, 2009) 
 
 
Figure 4.37 Ground damage adjacent to the bank of the Selwyn tributary near the end of 
Gillanders Rd (Darfield side); (Position marked as Photo 1 in Fig. 4.36) 
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Figure 4.38 Liquefaction on the grass verge adjacent to the end of Gillanders Rd (Darfield 
side). Note the fine gravel particles on the surface and the fissure towards the top right hand 
side ‐ it was possible to push the sampling spoon to a depth of about 300 mm into the fissure 
(Position marked as Photo 2 in Fig. 4.36) 
 
 
The liquefaction was located on the Selwyn Forks property (map reference BX22 250727). 
Access was a little difficult because a farm creek was being fed from an errant tributary of the 
Hororata River. The liquefaction was distributed across several fields. Material was ejected 
from fissures in the ground which are likely to be lateral spreads given the stream channels 
nearby. The ejected material was topped off with a layer of coarse gravel (Figure 4.39). 
Figure 4.40 shows not only sand and gravel but also clods of topsoil. It is not clear if the 
gravel was part of the liquefied layer or was carried to the surface with the ejected sand. 
When questioned, Mr Ridgen suggested that the ground profile consisted of topsoil, gravel 
and then sand. If this profile is confirmed then the gravel is probably carried to the surface by 
the liquefied sand coming from below.  
Further liquefaction has been reported up the Selwyn beyond the Selwyn Forks property. The 
team has not been able to confirm this by their own inspection. 
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Figure 4.39 Material ejected from a fissure on the Selwyn Forks farm (front paddock). Note 
the gravel overlying the brown coloured sand. This is what was visible after a night of rain. 
(Position marked as Photo 3 in Fig. 4.36.) 
 
 
Figure 4.40 Ejected material on another paddock of the Selwyn Forks farm (Sheepyard 
paddock). As well as sand and gravel the ejecta contain clods of topsoil. (Position marked as 
Photo 4 in Fig. 4.36.) 
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Selwyn River near Irwell 
Further liquefaction adjacent to the Selwyn River, not far from the town of Leeston, was 
evident of the Willow Lea property near Irwell (Figure 4.41). 
Figure 4.42 shows the material ejected at the position labeled Photo 5 (Figure 4.41, Lincoln 
BX23 479 626 (43° 41’ 17” S 172° 21’ 12” E) illustrating that the material ejected consisted 
of sand with some gravel. Comparison of photos in Figures 4.39, 4.40 and 4.42, shows that 
the materials ejected at Selwyn Forks and at Willow Lea were similar. 
The farmer at Willow Lea, Mr Mark Fleming, reported that the fissures he observed were at 
least 2 m deep based on probing with a length of number 8 fencing wire. He also explained 
that the width of the fissures had increased gradually since the earthquake and that the 
prominence of the ejected sand had decreased with time (the photograph in Figure 4.42 was 
taken on September 29). More instances of liquefaction have been reported on other 
properties further down the Selwyn River, but the team has not confirmed this by site visits. 
Near Clearwater 
Liquefaction also occurred near the Clearwater development along Johns Road (43° 27’ 
15.96” S and 172° 35’ 42.89” E). Figure 4.43 shows that gravel was ejected in addition to 
sand. There were a number of other instances of liquefaction in the open ground adjacent to 
the example illustrated in Figure 4.43. 
 
Willow Lea homestead
Selwyn River
Photo 5 (BX23 479 626)
Photo 6 (BX23 475 626)
 
Figure 4.41  Location of the liquefaction along the Selwyn River in the Irwell region. (Date 
of Google image July 13, 2009) 
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Figure 4.42 Ejected sand and gravel at the Willow Lea property (position marked as Photo 5 
in Fig. 4.41) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.43  Ejected sand and gravel in the Clearwater area (photo by Ian McCahon) 
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Most Distal liquefaction feature  
The most distal liquefaction features from the epicentre and fault rupture that the team 
members found or heard about are in Waikuku Beach, north of Kaiapoi along the coast, and 
in Akaroa, southeast of Christchurch on Banks Peninsula. The site-to-source distance to 
Akaroa is slightly more than to Waikuku Beach. The epicentral distance and closest distance 
to the fault rupture for the Akaroa site are ~54 and 44 km, respectively. These distances are 
plotted in Figure 4.44, along with data from worldwide earthquakes compiled by Ambraseys 
(1988). As may be observed from this figure, the epicentral distance falls well within the 
boundary for maximum distance, but the closest distance to the fault rupture is close to the 
boundary formed by data from other earthquakes. 
 
 
Figure 4.44. Comparison of the most distal liquefaction feature from the Darfield Earthquake 
with worldwide earthquake data collected by Ambraseys (1988) (Adapted from Rathje et al., 
2010). 
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5.   IMPACT ON BUILDING STRUCTURES  
 
General 
Major impacts to building structures during the Darfield event of September 4, 2010 were related 
to unreinforced masonry or brick (URM) buildings and residential areas where ground failure 
below or nearby the foundation was observed. Modern structures supported on stable ground in 
general performed well. Many URM and brick structures, particularly in the Christchurch 
business district, suffered complete or partial collapse due to strong shaking (e.g. Figure 5.1). All 
of these structures were under 3 stories, with most being 1-2 stories (about 70%). Of the 595 
URM buildings in Christchurch surveyed by city inspection teams immediately following the 
earthquake, 21% were assigned usability ratings of red, 32% yellow, and 47% green (Moon, 
2010; Ingam and Griffith, 2010). The structural damage to URM and brick buildings, where 
ground failure was not observed, is being documented by the EERI and other post-earthquake 
reconnaissance teams. Interested readers should consult their reports for comprehensive 
documentation of the structural performance of buildings where ground failure did not impact 
performance.  
 
 
  
Figure 5.1. Structural collapse of a URM in the Christchurch Business District. (184 Manchester 
Street). Photograph courtesy of Prof Jason Ingham 
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Ground failure including liquefaction and lateral spreading resulted in extensive damage to both 
new and old construction, impacting houses, light commercial, school and church buildings 
within neighbourhoods. The most prevalent type of damage included extensive subsidence, 
tilting, and separation of the structural components of the building. Importantly lateral spreading 
ground was observed to have detrimental impact on light residential construction. Slab 
foundations did not provide sufficient restraint of the ground movement to preclude extensive 
structural separation in many situations were excessive ground spreading features were observed. 
In this chapter of the report, several important cases that provide insight regarding the effects of 
ground failure on buildings are documented. 
 
Kaiapoi area 
Kaiapoi small business area 
Small businesses line the fronts of Charles Street paralleling the Kaiapoi River from 
approximately Jones St to Davie St (Figure 5.2). The vintage of these structures vary, however, 
most are single or 2 stories and constructed of light wood framing with brick façade, or stucco, 
or solely of concrete masonry block. Extensive lateral spreading parallel to the Kaiapoi River 
extended into the small business and residential regions impacting numerous structures within 
this community. Liquefaction was evident beyond the lateral spread as discussed in Chapter 4. 
The most severe damage to structures within the small business community along Charles Street 
is shown in Figures 5.3-5.9. The Gospel Way church for example, a single storey structure of 
brick construction, suffered separation of its heavy front structure from its orthogonal support 
walls due to lateral movement of the ground towards Charles Street (Figures 5.3-5.5). The large 
lateral ground spreads extended northeast along the longitudinal axis of the building as evident in 
the adjacent parking area (Figure 5.4). This ground movement manifested into distinct shear 
cracks at the brick-mortar joints (Figure 5.5a). Structural separation such as that evident in 
Figure 5.5a was visible at several distinct locations extending along the longitudinal axis of the 
building. The most severe damage was evident at the front of this building, which settled 
approximately 15 cm, while the eastern length of the building remained approximately level 
(Figure 5.5b).  
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Figure 5.2. Kaiapoi North residential and small business region. Annotated GoogleEarth image 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Front facing (view looking northeast) of the Gospel Way church in Kaiapoi along 
Charles Street. (1000 hrs on 11 September 2010) 
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Figure 5.4 Lateral spread patterns extending east along the longitudinal axis of the Gospel Way 
church in Kaiapoi along Charles Street. (1000 hrs on 11 September 2010) 
 
 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 5.5 Gospel Way Church in Kaiapoi: (a) Shear crack pattern developed at brick-mortar 
joints along the northern side of the building and (b) separation (settlement and rotation) of the 
west face of the building. (1000 hrs on 11 September 2010) 
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A small shopping area neighbouring the New World supermarket in Kaiapoi (between Williams 
and Jones streets north-south and Sewell and Charles streets east-west) showed patterns of 
extensive ground damage and resulted in many business closures (Figure 5.6a). Closures were 
primarily prompted by extensive hardscape and interior flooring damage (Figure 5.6b). These 
buildings attached units of one storey wood framed construction supported on slabs on grade and 
with glass front (open) facing as is common of walking business districts. The tallest structure to 
suffer damage in the direct adjacency to these business units was a red-tagged 3-storey property 
and family law office constructed of concrete masonry block units (CMU) (Figures 5.7-5.8). This 
structure is rectangular in footprint with little to no lateral resistance along the longitudinal axis 
of the building (as evident from the perimeter full facing glass openings – Figure 5.7a). The short 
axis of the building provides resistance to lateral movement and loads via stiff full length CMU 
walls at exterior ends of the structure (Figure 5.7b). The front of this building appeared to have 
settled and rotated towards the direction (southwest) (Figure 5.8). Lateral spread ground failure 
and liquefaction ejecta were evident directly adjacent to this building (Figure 5.9). A sample of 
material taken adjacent to this building was tested using laser diffraction scanning (Figure 5.10, 
denoted WP24).  
 
 
 
 
71
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
Figure 5.6 Small business attached units neighbouring the Small World supermarket in Kaiapoi 
(Charles Street). (a) View looking east showing ground damage pattern and (b) resulting 
hardscape damage at the front of one business unit. (1045 hrs on 11 September 2010) 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
 
Figure 5.7 Property and Family Law Offices in Kaiapoi business district. (Williams Street)       
(a) View looking northwest (at long axis end) of building and (b) view looking northeast 
showing shearwall ends of short axis of building. (1100 hrs on 11 September 2010) 
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Figure 5.8 Property and Family Law Offices in Kaiapoi business district. (Williams Street). View 
looking at west short axis end of the building (1100 hrs on 11 September 2010) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.9 Surrounding ground failure patterns directly adjacent to the Property and Family Law 
Offices in Kaiapoi business district. View looking southeast (1100 hrs on 11 September 2010) 
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Figure 5.10. Grain-size distribution of samples taken from ejecta observed in Kaiapoi area 
(sample taken 11 September 2010 testing via laser diffraction). Sample WP24 taken at 
43.381856°S, 172.659149°E (adjacent to law offices) and sample WP28 taken at 43.384723°S, 
172.661314°E (adjacent to Kaiapoi wharf) 
Movement of the Kaiapoi wharf resulted in damage to the historic Kaiapoi Railway Station, 
which is now renovated and used as the Kaiapoi Information Centre (43.3838°S, 172.6596°E) 
and its neighbouring Harbour Building (43.3834°S, 172.6591°E). The Kaiapoi Information 
Centre building is a renovated wood framed building on an elevated foundation (Figure 5.11). As 
a result of loss of ground support, this building tilted approximately 5 degrees northeast (away 
from the river). Rapid stabilization of the building had been complete by the time of the NZ-
GEER team visit on 11 September 2010 in the form of concrete footings poured on the exposed 
(near river) foundation side of the building (Figure 5.11b). In addition, tension tie-backs 
anchored from newly poured concrete footings to a patio area were used to stabilize the upper 
pavement during the continuing ground movement. The Harbour building is a one-storey 
masonry block building that suffered tilting towards the river and separation from the wharf of 
approximately 15-25cm on its west face (Figure 5.12). 
North of the Kaiapoi Information Centre and Harbour Buildings, a two storey wood frame 
building with subterranean parking (nearest to river) and a full floor level (nearest to Charles 
Street) currently housing the Bridge Tavern building was extensively damaged due to ground 
movement (Figure 5.13). Although movement of the retaining wall adjacent to the Kaiapoi River 
was not evident, the east embankment side, which supported the first storey subterranean parking 
area showed evidence of ground settlement and cracking. This damage precipitated movement of 
columns supporting the upper storey of the building (Figure 5.13b).  
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Soil samples taken from the largest visible ground ejecta features within the park adjacent to the 
Kaiapoi River liken the material to that observed within the small business district of Kaiapoi 
(Figure 5.10). These grain size distribution curves indicate the material directly adjacent to the 
wharf and likely extending into the neighbouring park is a uniformly graded sandy soil with 
about 30% fines (Table 5.1). In contrast material further from the rivers’ edge (e.g. WP28 taken 
within the small business district of Kaiapoi) although similarly sandy and uniformly, graded 
contains a more appreciable amount of fines (30%). The largest content of fines of these samples 
approached 70% (WP169 taken at the Lyttelton Oil Terminal). 
 
 
Table 5.1 Summary of laser diffraction testing results 
WP Location GPS Coordinates %Fines
D10 
(mm) 
D30 
(mm) 
D60 
(mm) Cc Cu 
WP24 
Kaiapoi adjacent to 
wharf 
43.3819S°, 
172.6591E° 30 0.037 0.075 0.129 1.179 3.486 
WP28 Kaiapoi business 
43.3847°S, 
172.6613°E 10 0.075 0.129 0.214 1.038 2.851 
WP104 Bexley Residential 
43.5190°S, 
172.7202°E 10 0.075 0.127 0.185 1.168 2.463 
WP169 Lyttelton Oil Terminal 
43.6088°S, 
172.7142°E 70 0.023 0.042 0.065 1.164 2.813 
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(a) 
 
 
(b) 
Figure 5.11 Renovated Kaiapoi Railway building now used the Kaiapoi Information Centre, 
adjacent to the Kaiapoi Wharf. (a) View looking northwest and (b) view looking southeast (note 
the temporary elevated patio support tie-backs and newly poured footings at the front (river side) 
of the building. (43.3838°S, 172.6596°E; 1300 hrs on 11 September 2010). 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 5.12 Harbour building adjacent to the Kaiapoi River and wharf structures. (a) View 
looking southeast and (b) view of the northwest corner of the building. Note the approximate 15-
25cm gap between the pavement and building. (43.3834°S, 172.6591°E;  1345 hrs on 11 
September 2010). 
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(a) 
 
 
(b) 
Figure 5.13 Bridge Tavern adjacent to the Kaiapoi River. (a) view looking northwest at Williams 
Street bridge and (b) view looking northwest at subterranean parking. (43.3826°S, 172.6582°E; 
1345 hrs on 11 September 2010) 
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Kaiapoi residential 
The most severe structural damage to houses in the Kaiapoi residential neighbourhoods was 
evident along Charles Street paralleling the Kaiapoi River (Kaiapoi North) as well as along 
Courtenay Drive, which parallels a branch of the Courtenay Stream (east of Kaiapoi South) 
(Figure 5.14).  
 
 
Figure 5.14. Kaiapoi North and South residential areas. Annotated GoogleEarth image. 
 
Kaiapoi North – Residential construction within the Kaiapoi North community consists of 1-2 
storey wood or concrete block framed homes. A number of homes are also constructed of brick 
or wood with brick façade units. The vintage of these homes appeared to extend as early as 
1960’s construction, to more recent completely rebuilt or remodelled homes. Uniform settlement 
of the heavier brick constructed residential homes in this area, such as shown in Figure 5.15, 
were measured as large as 20-25cm. Brick homes consistently observed shear cracking, 
discontinuities between window and door openings and brick, popped out and/or damaged glass 
windows, and damage to floor slabs and hardscape (Figure 5.16). Homes along Charles Street at 
the time of the NZ-GEER team visit (11 September 2010) were either red or yellow tagged. Very 
few homes were occupied, with most suffering extensive sand ejecta surrounding the home as 
well as settlement. In a number of cases, residents of severely damaged homes had moved out 
completely (e.g. Figures 5.17-5.18). This house at Charles Street experienced approximately 0.4 
m of settlement along its North face (Figure 5.17b). Sand ejecta were present surrounding most 
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homes along Charles Street and extending east into the North Kaiapoi residential area 
approximately 0.5 km. 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 5.15 Residence along Charles Street. (a) Ejecta surrounding home and (b) shear cracking 
and gapping developed between window and brick due to structures movement. (1115 hrs on 11 
September 2010) 
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Figure 5.16 Residence along Charles Street (same structure as Figure 5.16). Damage to glass 
windows and between window and wall. (1115 hrs on 11 September 2010) 
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(a) 
 
 
(b) 
Figure 5.17 Red tagged residence on Charles Street. (a) View looking east and (b) north end of 
house, view looking North-East. (1130 hrs on 11 September 2010) 
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(a) (b) 
Figure 5.18 Red tagged residence on Charles Street. Extensive surrounding ejecta at perimeter of 
home (1130 hrs on 11 September 2010) 
 
Kaiapoi South – In general damage to building structures in the Kaiapoi South community was 
limited to Courtenay Drive between Kaikanui Street and ending at Parish Lane. This is a 
residential neighbourhood with relatively new homes, all constructed within the last ten years. 
Most homes are one-storey light wood framing or brick supported on unreinforced slabs with 
perimeter stemwall foundations and light metal roofing. An example of the typical construction 
style in this area is shown in Figure 5.19. Liquefaction was reported to inundate the 
neighbourhood north of Courtenay Drive towards Charters Street, however much of this had 
been cleaned up by the time of the NZ-GEER team visit and appeared to have minimal impact on 
the homes. The impact to homes along Courtenay Drive however, and particularly those on the 
east side of the drive, with direct facing to a paddocks’ field as well as a branch of the Courtenay 
Stream, was extensive. Ground failure in this region manifested in large lateral spread zones 
coupled with liquefaction (Figure 5.20). A manual survey by the NZ-GEER team indicated that 
of the 44 homes along this drive 48% suffered severe structural damage induced by ground 
failure, while 15 (36%) suffered moderate and minor damage, respectively. Laterally spreading 
ground was observed to extend through the backyards of these homes, with the lack of 
reinforcement within slab foundations and general light construction styles resulting in severe 
separation of the home directly in-line with the ground failure. The residences shown in Figures 
5.21-5.24 demonstrate the observed damage due to excessive ground movement. The structure 
shown in Figures 5.21-5.22 suffered excessive tilting and a separation of 1.5 m from its approach 
driveway to the front of the home (Figure 5.22a), while the rear of the home collapsed inward 
due to surrounding ground fissures (Figure 5.22b). Similarly, the residence in Figures 5.23-5.24 
articulated little to no damage at the backside of the home (Figure 5.23), however the front entry 
 
 
 
 
84
of the home at the interface between the garage and main portion of the residence suffered a 
separation of about 1m due to lateral ground movement (Figure 5.24). 
 
 
Figure 5.19 Typical construction style of homes along Courtenay Drive in the South Kaiapoi 
residential community. (1430 hrs on 11 September 2010) 
 
 
Figure 5.20 Ground failure feature extending through the backyard of a home on the south side 
of Courtenay Drive in the South Kaiapoi residential community. (1500 hrs on 11 September 
2010) 
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(a) 
 
 
(b) 
 
Figure 5.21 Damage to a residence at Courtenay Drive in the South Kaiapoi residential 
community (front of home articulating excessive tilt and separation of foundation from 
surrounding hardscape). (1545 hrs on 11 September 2010) 
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(a) 
 
 
(b) 
Figure 5.22 Damage to a residence at Courtenay Drive in the South Kaiapoi residential 
community (a) front of home (1.5 m separation between garage and approach slab) and (b) back 
of home. (1545 hrs on 11 September 2010) 
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Figure 5.23 Damage to a residence along Courtenay Drive in the South Kaiapoi residential 
community.  Backside of home facing Paddocks field articulates relatively no damage                 
(1600 hrs on 11 September 2010) 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 5.24 Damage to a residence along Courtenay Drive in the South Kaiapoi residential 
community.  Front entry articulates extensive damage as large ground spreading subtends into 
the superstructure. (1600 hrs on 11 September 2010) 
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Dallington Area 
Dallington Residential 
The Dallington residential community was heavily impacted by liquefaction, and where the 
Avon River meanders through the community, those structures nearest the river were impacted 
by lateral spreading (see Chapter 4 for details regarding liquefaction extent in this area). The 
structural impact on residences was largely localized to settlement and rigid body movement in 
these regions, with the exception of St. Paul’s church and surrounding school (refer to 
subsequent section) and residences nearest to the Avon River which suffered loss of ground 
support due to lateral spreading. Residential construction in this area appeared to be range in 
vintage, with the oldest houses constructed in the early 1900s and predominant construction 
dates from 1960s for the rest. Most structures were brick or light wood framing with stucco 
finish and 1-storey. A few structures had been remodelled to incorporate a second storey. The 
foundation system of these residential structures appeared to be stem walls with floating slabs or 
in some cases elevated wood flooring was apparent as viewed from access crawlspaces. 
Residents interviewed in this neighbourhood indicated that, following the mainshock, the sand 
ejecta with thicknesses on the order of 60-70 cm encompassed in many cases their entire 
property.  
Two common types of damage to residential structures within this community are shown in 
Figures 5.25 and 5.26. Both of these structures are located near the Avon River. The residence 
shown in Figure 5.25a directly fronts the Avon River and experienced approximately 3 degrees 
of rigid body tilt directly south towards the river. Structurally the home was in good condition, 
though inspection of the interior articulated extensive floor and nonstructural damage. Lateral 
spreading extension features were observed at the front of the residence at the river and 
continued north behind this residence (Figure 5.25b). Transects taken by the NZ-GEER team on 
14 September 2010 at this location indicate 85 cm of lateral extension fronted the residence, with 
vertical offsets in extensions as large as 19 cm and cracks extending as great as 105 cm (T7 in 
Figure 5.27). Figure 5.26 shows a house in Locksley Avenue, which illustrates a loss of ground 
support subtended along the structure length. At this location lateral spreading towards the Avon 
River (behind the position from which the photo was taken) is evident in the driveway. 
Differential settlement along the length of the house manifests itself as shear cracking and 
separation of the mortar-brick within the brick veneer wall. This mode of deformation is similar, 
but less intense, to that imposed on the slab-on-ground foundations of the houses illustrated in 
Figures 5.20-5.24.  
Detailed mapping of lateral spreading features extending from the Avon River into the 
Dallington residential community were performed by a NZ-GEER team on 14 September 2010. 
A map of these transect locations is shown in Figure 5.27. Future reports will include elevations 
and additional details of these ground features. 
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(a) 
 
 
(b) 
 
Figure 5.25 (a) Rigid body rotation of a residence in Dallington (Locksley Avenue) due to 
liquefaction and (b) lateral spread features directly fronting the home. Surveys of ground features 
at this location are associated with T7 (refer to Figure 5.27). 1200 hrs on 14 September 2010 
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Figure 5.26.  Residence affected by lateral spreading along the driveway which has induced 
differential settlement between the front and rear of the house. (Note that this is not a slab-on-
ground house, and older style of construction with a concrete perimeter beam and the timber 
floor being supported on shallow foundations; Locksley Ave.; 1130 hrs on 14 September 2010) 
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Figure 5.27 Ground feature mapping locations taken by the NZ-GEER team on 14 September 
2010 (Annotations overlaid with GoogleEarth image) 
 
St. Paul’s Church and School 
A historically significant feature in the neighbourhood of Dallington is the St. Paul’s church and 
surrounding school (Figure 5.28; 43.5196°S, 172.6725°E). St. Paul’s church was severely 
damaged due to surrounding ground movement, which was precipitated by extensive liquefaction 
within the general area shown in Figure 5.28. Most significantly the structure suffered through 
building separation due to ground extension and vertical offset subtending north-south 
approximately one-third of the length along the west end (orange separation location denoted in 
Figure 5.29). This resulted in structural separation of the building into two distinct structures. 
The West end of the building rotated 2 degrees south and 4 degrees west (Figures 5.30-5.33), 
resulting in 46 cm of settlement of the south-west corner (estimated with reference to prior 
ground elevation). No significant lateral translation of the building was measured at its perimeter 
rather structural movement was confined to rotation and settlement as described in Figure 5.29. 
This relatively heavy single storey structure was constructed of running bond brick perimeter 
walls, with a timber (truss) roof. Wall heights were approximately 8m at the perimeter of the 
sloping roof and 5.5m at flat portions. An approximately 12m tall tower is articulated at the 
southeast corner of the structure (Figure 5.33b). The ridgeline extends across the longitudinal 
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axis (running approximately east-west) along the building. The north and south (long axis ends) 
of the building articulate approximately 25% glass windows. Similarly the East entry facing 
Gayhurst Road presents stained glass features surrounded by brick walls (Figure 5.33b). The 
foundation was not accessible at the time of the NZ-GEER team’s visit.  
Surrounding St. Paul’s church is an Integrated State school affiliated with the church (buildings 
denoted B1-B8 in Figure 5.28). Building B1 (Figure 5.34) and B6 (Figure 5.36) are constructed 
of running bond brick perimeter walls with light metal roofs, whereas buildings B4, B5, and B7 
incorporate light wood framing along their longitudinal axes and brick along their transverse 
axes (e.g. Figure 5.37). Building B2 is constructed of concrete masonry block units (Figure 
5.35). All structures within the school appeared to be supported on elevated stem wall footings 
with interior wood joists, with the exception of B2, which appeared to be at grade with a slab on 
ground. Buildings B1-B8 are all single storey with wall heights ranging from 7-8m. Stiff brick 
and CMU buildings within this school complex suffered shear cracking and in some cases 
significant separation of brick-mortar joints (e.g. Figures 5.35b and 5.36b). Likewise mixed 
construction structures, such as building B7 suffered damage due to relative movement between 
contrasting materials (Figure 5.37b). Flexible wood buildings suffered little observable structural 
damage with the exception of hairline cracks in stucco aligned with ground movement features. 
 
Figure 5.28. St. Paul’s church and school in Dallington area (43.5196°S, 172.6725°E). Notation 
“B#” is used for reference only to identify adjacent buildings (see discussion). Annotated 
GoogleEarth image 
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Figure 5.29. St. Paul’s church damage map – survey conducted 12 September 2010; Global 
dimensions approximate (extracted from GoogleEarth image), deformation obtained directly in 
the field 
 
 
Figure 5.30. St. Paul’s church in Dallington area  - overall view of building looking north-east 
(1345 hrs on 12 September 2010) 
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Figure 5.31. St. Paul’s church in Dallington area - view looking north at ground failure, which 
continued through building  (1400 hrs on 12 September 2010)  
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 5.32. St. Paul’s church in Dallington area - view looking north (a) far view of separated 
west end of building and (b) close-up view of structural separation (1400 hrs on September 
2010) 
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(a) 
 
 
 
(b) 
Figure 5.33. St. Paul’s church in Dallington area: (a) view looking east at the west end and (b) 
view looking west at the east end (1400 hrs on 12 September 2010) 
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Figure 5.34 St. Paul’s church and surrounding school - Building B1 (on left) and St. Paul’s 
church (on right). (1345 hrs on 12 September 2010) 
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(a) 
 
 
(b) 
Figure 5.35 St. Paul’s church and surrounding school - Building B2: (a) view looking west and 
(b) view from north side of building, looking south. (1300 hrs on 12 September 2010) 
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(a) 
 
 
(b) 
Figure 5.36 St. Paul’s church and surrounding school - Building B6 view looking south: (a) 
overall view of building and (b) West end of building. (1300 hrs on 12 September 2010) 
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(a) (b) 
Figure 5.37 St. Paul’s church and surrounding school - Building B7: (a) view looking east and 
(b) view of south-west corner of building articulating column damage at wood-brick interface. 
(1400 hrs on 12 September 2010) 
 
Bexley Residential Area  
In the residential area of Bexley, homes were significantly affected by lateral spreading (e.g. 
Figures 5.38-5.39). The lateral spreading was apparent from walking around the path along the 
southern boundary of the subdivision next to the wetland. Fissures of 300 mm or greater in width 
traversed the ground of several properties. A floor slab fissure (estimated width 50 to 75 mm, 
visible because the carpet had been lifted) extended across the full width of one house. 
Settlement had occurred but with relatively little tilting. Given that the fissure went through the 
concrete floor slab, there appeared to be relatively little damage to the walls. 
Foundation details taken during a visit to one home in Bexley are shown in Figure 5.40. The 
system set-out in Figure 5.40 is a perimeter beam with two D16 bars, D10 starter bars 600mm 
long at 600 mm centres around the edges. The cavity inside the perimeter beam is filled with 
coarse gravel, covered with dampcourse, and then topped with a 100mm thick concrete slab, 
which, apart from the starter bars, is mostly unreinforced. The drawing in Figure 5.40 specifies 
mesh reinforcing in areas that are to be tiled or covered in vinyl. Nonetheless, reinforcing was 
not observed to cross any fissure as noted in the drawing.  
For contrast, an open foundation construction in the Pines Beach area (near Kaiapoi) was 
observed on 12 September 2010. The perimeter footing had been completed and the gravel fill 
was in place, the concrete slab was yet to come. Assuming the top of the perimeter footing was 
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close to level before the event, it was apparent that the footing was not capable of withstanding 
the ground deformation during the earthquake as the footing was no longer level (Figure 5.41). 
Two D16 reinforcing bars were observed in this footing where cracking had occurred. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.38. Lateral spreading compromising ground support beneath the concrete slab-on-grade 
house foundation. (Kokopu Street; 1030hrs on 12 September 2010) 
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Figure 5.39. Fissure in concrete floor slab (to the left hand side passing beneath the ladder). 
(Same house as in Figure 5.38.) (Kokopu Street; 1030hrs on 12 September 2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.40. Concrete slab-on-ground details for the Bexley houses. 
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Figure 5.41. Site at Pines Beach which appears to be using the same slab-on-grade system as at 
Bexley (Chichester Street; 1800hrs on 12 September 2010) 
 
 
Concrete slab-on-grade foundations have been used in New Zealand for single and two storey 
timber framed houses for more than 40 years. The current code covering this type of construction 
is NZS3604:1999 “Timber framed buildings”, which has evolved from previous versions dated 
1984 and 1990. The slab-on-grade details shown in Figure 5.40 appear to be in compliance with 
the NZS3604 which allows, for single storey dwellings, unreinforced floor slabs in dry areas but 
requires mesh in wet areas. The application of NZS3604 is based on the concept of “good 
ground”. If the site satisfies this condition then no additional engineering design is required as 
the developer is able to follow the details set out in NZS3604. Site conditions that exclude the 
application of NZS3604 are specified as peat, soft clay and expansive clay, all of which are 
identifiable using rudimentary site investigation techniques. Liquefiable soil is not mentioned. 
Preliminary site investigations, conducted following this earthquake, indicate that the liquefiable 
layer is often deeper than 1 m and not infrequently deeper than 2 m (Figure 5.42). This means 
that the possibility of liquefaction is not as easily identifiable as the above three “good ground” 
exclusions. 
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Figure 5.42. N_DCPT for the liquefiable layer for Spencerville (left: 43.43075˚S, 172.693000˚E; 
43.431583˚S, 172.693233˚E), Bexley (middle: 43.518370˚S, 172.722050˚E) and Courtenay 
Drive (right: 43.390010˚S, 172.662640˚E) 
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Figure 5.43 Spencerville and Brooklands communities (inset on right identifies surveys 
conducted by NZ-GEER team on 14 September 2010 along Riverside Lane); Annotated 
GoogleEarth image 
 
 
Spencerville Residential Area 
The residential communities of Spencerville and Brooklands were significantly impacted by 
liquefaction and lateral spreading induced ground damage. Lateral spreading was confined to 
regions along the Styx River (Figure 5.43), whereas liquefaction was pervasive throughout these 
two small communities, but particularly along the regions nearest the Brooklands Lagoon. 
Particularly significant structural damage due to laterally spreading ground was observed along 
Riverside Lane paralleling the Styx River (inset on right of Figure 5.43). Here five large and 
newly constructed (all within the last 10 years) homes were severely damaged due to laterally 
spreading ground (Figures 5.44-5.47). These houses were relatively large structures (200-
300m2), compared to other developments in or surrounding Christchurch, and each appeared to 
be a custom design. All appeared to be resting on slab foundations with either light wood 
framing or brick/CMU walls. Unlike other areas affected by the earthquake, little ejected sand 
was observed, however strain relief manifested in the form of large lateral spreading ground 
fissures up to 400-500 mm in width in the worst places. The houses suffered only minimal 
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settlement, however the laterally spreading ground continued through the homes, tearing ground 
slabs apart and propagating structural damage upwards towards the roofline (the roofline damage 
pattern here was not unlike that seen at St Paul’s church in Dallington). From perimeter and 
interior views of the foundations of these homes, no reinforcing steel appeared to be present in 
the main slab. Residential structures in this area with the most severe damage were those with 
their longitudinal axis in the direction of the lateral spreading. Lateral spread features were long 
and extended through many properties (e.g. Figure 5.48). One home oriented with its long axis 
perpendicular to the direction of lateral spread had some damage at the connection between the 
garage and the house proper, but, unlike the others, was still occupied. 
 
 
 
 
(a) (b) 
 
Figure 5.44. Ruptured floor slab near the front entrance of Riverside Lane. Clearly visible is the 
gravel infill shown in Figure 5.41 (note that there appears to be no ejected sand present). (a) 
ground fissure separating front entry of home and (b) same ground feature propagated through 
home and departing on opposing side (1230hrs on 13 September 2010) 
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Figure 5.45. Interior view of residence at Riverside Lane. Note the two floor breaks visible in the 
picture (1500hrs on 28 September 2010) 
  
 
 
Figure 5.46. Lateral spread adjacent to residence at Riverside Lane. The location of this fissure is 
about 26 metres from the nearby Styx River. (1230 hrs on 13 September 2010). 
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Figure 5.47. House with fissured floor slab with damage carried through to the roof line which is 
no longer weather proof. (Riverside Lane, Spencerville). (1600hrs on 28 September 2010) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.48 Separated fence line due to propagating ground fissure meandering between homes 
along Riverside Lane. (1230hrs on 13 September 2010) 
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Summary Remarks 
The above descriptions of structural damage as induced by ground failure lead to the conclusion 
that lateral spreading places much more severe demands on structures and particularly their 
foundations than that of liquefaction alone. Most importantly in this earthquake, residential 
structures were severely impacted by ground failure. Specifically, the following observations can 
be made: 
• Large lateral spread fissures in many cases split entirely ground slabs and further 
propagated damage upward into structural walls and rooflines, in some cases creating 
severe structural separation.  
• Geometric and reinforcing detailing for residential foundations appeared to consistently 
incorporate 100 mm thick unreinforced concrete slabs resting on perimeter footings 
reinforced with 2xD16 bars (Figure 5.44).  
• In areas with significant liquefaction where little to no lateral spreading occurred, the 
main foundation response was settlement (uniform and/or tilting). In the worst instances 
the settlement was up to several hundred millimetres, however often with comparatively 
mild tilting. 
In areas with little to no lateral spreading, slab-on-ground foundations appeared to cope with 
modest amounts of liquefaction. 
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6. PERFORMANCE OF STOPBANKS (OR LEVEES) AND OXIDATION POND 
EMBANKMENTS 
History of stopbank construction 
Shortly after their arrival in the Canterbury area in the mid-nineteenth century, the western 
settlers started constructing drainage systems and stopbanks (or levees) along rivers (Larned et 
al., 2008). Particularly, flooding of the Waimakariri River and tributaries posed a constant threat 
to the Christchurch and Kaiapoi areas. Early efforts to contain the rivers within their banks were 
piecemeal and only partially successful. To better coordinate the efforts, the Waimakariri River 
Trust was established in 1923 (Griffiths, 1979). In response to the 1926 floods (Figure 6.1), the 
Trust implemented a major river improvement scheme in 1930, known as the Hays No. 2 
Scheme. Among other things, the scheme entailed an overall improvement of the stopbank 
system along the Waimakariri River. However, these improvements were unable to prevent the 
major floods in 1940, 1950, and 1957. These floods prompted a further river improvement 
scheme in 1960, which entailed benching existing stopbanks and construction of new stopbanks, 
which were compacted with vibrating rollers (Boyle, 2010). The stopbanks were designed to 
provide protection against the 100-year flood (Griffiths, 1979). Unfortunately, the geotechnical 
reconnaissance team has not yet been able to obtain construction drawings and/or specifications 
used in either the 1930 or 1960 improvement schemes for the stopbanks and are uncertain if such 
drawings/specifications exist. 
 
 
Figure 6.1 1926 photograph of the Waimakariri River overflowing its banks in Christchurch. (Te 
Ara Encyclopedia of New Zealand, 2010) 
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Seismic performance of stopbanks 
The geotechnical reconnaissance team performed damage surveys along stretches of the primary 
and secondary stopbanks for the Waimakariri River and along the primary stopbanks for the 
Kaiapoi River on the morning of the earthquake (4 September 2010) and then again a few days 
later (between 9-16 September 2010) . The surveys were performed on foot, in an automobile, 
and from a helicopter. Figure 6.2 shows the stretches of the stopbanks that the NZ-GEER Team 
surveyed. The geotechnical reconnaissance team also corresponded with the Environment 
Canterbury (ECan) personnel (Ian Heslop and Tony Boyle) who are overseeing damage 
assessments and repairs of the stopbanks damaged during the earthquake. Below is a summary of 
the observed performance of the stopbanks along the Waimakariri and Kaiapoi Rivers.   
 
 
Figure 6.2 White lines denote the stretches of the stopbanks along the Waimakariri and Kaiapoi 
Rivers that the geotechnical reconnaissance team performed damage surveys. Also denoted in 
the figure is State Highway 1 (SH1) 
 
 
Waimakariri River 
Kaiapoi River 
SH1 
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Waimakariri River stopbanks 
The Waimakariri River is the largest of the rivers in northern Canterbury and flows from the 
Southern Alps to the Pacific Ocean. The mean annual flow of the river is 120 m3/sec. However, 
in 1957 the largest flood on record occurred, which had an estimated peak discharge of 4248 
m3/sec (Griffiths, 1979). This flood is estimated to have a 100 year return period and was used as 
the design basis flood for the stopbank improvement scheme implemented in the 1960s.  
Overall, the stopbanks along the Waimakariri River performed well during the earthquake, with 
only ~4 km out of ~17 km of stopbanks requiring repair (Boyle, 2010). The majority of the 
damage along the Waimakariri River was downstream of SH1 (Figure 6.3).  Repairs to the high 
priority sites were expected to be completed within a few weeks after the earthquake, with 
medium priority sites expected to be completed in a couple of months. The cost of the repairs to 
the high and medium priority sites is estimated to be ~$NZ 3m (Boyle, 2010).  
 
 
Figure 6.3 Post-earthquake damage survey of stopbanks performed by Riley Consultants for 
Environment Canterbury along the Waimakariri River, downstream of SH1, and Kaiapoi River. 
(Riley Consultants, 2010; courtesy of Ian Heslop and Tony Boyle, ECan) 
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Figures 6.4-6.9 are photographs of the stopbanks for the Waimakariri River along Coutts Island 
Rd. Numerous sand boils were found along the base of the stopbank for an ~0.5 km stretch 
(Figures 6.4-6.6), on both the river and land sides. By the time of the team's damage survey on 
11 September 2010, the top of the stopbank along this stretch had already been regraded (Figure 
6.7), likely to fill in longitudinal cracks that formed along the crest of the stopbank. Figure 6.8 is 
of a ~2-cm wide longitudinal crack in the crest of the stopbank, located just outside of the ~0.5 
km stretch where the crest road had been regraded. It is assumed that the longitudinal cracks in 
the stretch of the stopbank where the crest road had been regraded were more significant than 
that crack shown in Figure 6.8, thus warranting the regrading. The liquefaction along the base of 
the stopbank and longitudinal cracks in the crest abruptly stopped outside of the ~0.5 km stretch; 
this may be seen in Figure 6.9, where no damage to the stopbank could be found.  
 
 
Figure 6.4 Photo 1: Large sand boil at the base of the landside of the stopbank on Coutts Island 
Rd. (43.425018˚S, 172.628442˚E) 
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Figure 6.5 Photo 2: Crack running along base of stopbank on Coutts Island Rd (landside) and 
liquefaction ejecta. (43.424466˚S, 172.629907˚E) 
 
 
 
Figure 6.6 Photo 3: Liquefaction ejecta (centre of photo) along the base of the stopbank on 
Coutts Island Rd (riverside). (43.424093˚S, 172.630468˚E) 
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Figure 6.7 Photo 4: Road on top of stopbank that had recently been regraded, presumably after 
the earthquake to fill in longitudinal cracks formed during the earthquake. Liquefaction was 
observed along the base of both sides of the stopbank along this stretch. (43.423943˚S, 
172.631045˚E) 
 
 
Figure 6.8 Photo 5: ~2-cm wide crack running lengthwise along the top of the stopbank on 
Coutts Island Rd. This crack was at the edge of the ~0.5 km stretch of the stopbank where 
significant liquefaction was observed. Photo taken looking southwest (43.423440˚S, 
172.632349˚E) 
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Figure 6.9 Photo 6: Stretch of stopbank without evidence of liquefaction. In the distance, a small 
rise can be seen in the road. This rise is the start of the ~0.5 km stretch where liquefaction was 
observed along the base of the stopbank. (43.4225˚S, 172.6350˚E)  
 
From interviews with local land owners, this section of the land that experienced widespread 
liquefaction was part of an old river channel. This was confirmed by review of old maps of the 
area. Figure 6.10 is an aerial image of the Coutts Island Rd area with the 1865 south branch of 
the Waimakariri River channel highlighted in red. The ~0.5 km stretch of the stopbank where 
liquefaction was observed is denoted by the dashed yellow line (A) in this figure. As may be 
seen in this figure, the area that liquefied coincides with the location of the old river channel, 
while the stretches of stopbank with no observed liquefaction (dashed blue line) lie outside of the 
old river channel.   
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Figure 6.10 Overlay of 1865 stream channel on present day Coutts Island Rd. This image is ~3.5 
km across (centre 43.4266˚S, 172.6302˚E) (Google Inc. 2010) 
 
Three Dynamic Cone Penetration Tests (DCPT) and four Spectral Analysis of Surface Waves 
(SASW) tests were performed along the base of the stopbanks along Coutts Island Rd, both in 
the areas that did and did not liquefy (Figure 6.11). The results of these tests are presented in 
Figures 6.12-6.14. The DCPT is performed in a hole hand augered down to the top of the 
liquefied layer, with this layer identified by comparing sand boil ejecta with soil extracted with 
the auger at various depths. The test is performed until there was a noticeable increase in the 
DCPT N-value or we ran out of rods (~4.6 m from the top of the ground surface. (See the 
Liquefaction and Lateral Spreading chapter for a more detailed description of the DCPT test).   
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Figure 6.11 Photos 7 and 8: DCPT (left: 43.425137˚S, 172.628619˚E) and SASW test (right: 
43.424342˚S, 172.630473˚E) performed in areas that did and did not liquefy along the stopbank 
on Coutts Island Rd  
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Figure 6.12 Results from SASW tests (left: SASW1 43.425029˚S, 172.628676˚E; middle: 
SASW3 43.424351˚S, 172.630475˚E) and DCPT (right: DCPT1 43.425139˚S, 172.628618˚E) 
performed along the base of the stopbank on Coutts Island Rd in an area that liquefied        
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Figure 6.13 Results from SASW test (left: SASW2 43.426294˚S, 172.625439˚E) and DCPT 
(right: DCPT1 43.426186˚S, 172.625673˚E) performed along the base of the stopbank on Coutts 
Island Rd in an area that did not liquefy.        
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Figure 6.14 Results from SASW test (left: SASW4 43.422635˚S, 172.635038˚E) and DCPT 
(right: DCPT3 43.422685˚S, 172.635081˚E) performed along the base of the stopbank on Coutts 
Island Rd in an area that did not liquefy   
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Other than SASW3 and DCPT1, performed about 175 m from each other in an area that 
liquefied, the agreement between the SASW and DCPT results is not very good in terms of depth 
to a stiff, presumably nonliquefiable layer. Further analyses are required to fully understand why. 
However, the sites that did not liquefy were along the banks of the old river channel. A 
liquefiable layer could not be found in these areas using the hand auger, and the soil profiles 
(DCPT2 and DCPT3) consisted of clayey sand and peat. Given the depositional environment of 
these profiles, it is likely that the strata varied significantly laterally, which could be the 
explanation for the poor agreement between the DCPT and SASW test results.  
Figures 6.15 and 6.16 are photographs of a secondary stopbank for the Waimakariri River along 
State Highway 1. This stretch of the stopbank is denoted by a dashed yellow line (B) in Figure 
6.10. Liquefaction was observed on both sides of the stopbank and longitudinal cracks were 
observed running along the crest and sides of the stopbank (Figures 6.15 and 6.16). As may be 
seen from Figure 6.10, this stretch of the stopbank lies within the abandoned river channel of the 
old south branch of the Waimakariri River.  
 
 
      
Figure 6.15 Photos 9 and 10: ~5-cm wide longitudinal cracks running along the crest (left) and 
base (right) of a secondary stopbank for the Waimakariri River. Photo taken looking southwest; 
SH1 on left of stopbank (43.430108˚S, 172.643434˚E) 
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Figure 6.16 Photos 11 and 14: Liquefaction ejecta on both the river and landsides of the 
stopbank. (43.428968˚S, 172.645435˚E) 
 
 
Kaiapoi River stopbanks 
Kaiapoi is located at the north-eastern end of the Canterbury Plains, about 20 km north of 
Christchurch. The Kaiapoi River used to be a part of the eastern reach of the old north branch of 
the Waimakariri River (Griffiths, 1979) and cuts through the centre of Kaiapoi. The Kaiapoi 
River joins the Waimakariri River on the eastern edge of town and flows to the sea (Figure 6.2). 
Liquefaction was widespread along the northern and southern banks of the Kaiapoi River and 
adjacent neighbourhoods.  
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The stopbanks confining the flow of the Kaiapoi River suffered damage at various locations 
(Figure 6.3). These embankments, measuring about 2.5 m high (from the water line at the time of 
our observations) and 2.7 m wide, have slopes of approximately 2H:1V on the riverside and 
3H:1V on the landside near the Williams St. bridge, which remained serviceable after the 
earthquake despite incipient liquefaction in the abutments and settlement and cracking of the 
approach on the eastern side of the bridge.  
In downtown Kaiapoi adjacent to the river, the Visitors' Information Centre on the north side of 
the river sank and tilted as a result of liquefaction and lateral spreading (Figure 6.17). Ground 
cracks, as wide as 30 cm and as deep as 100 cm, were observed running parallel to the river near 
this structure.   The two-storey Waimakariri-Ashley Coastguard building adjacent to the Visitor 
Centre also suffered the same effects. Just east of this building (~100 m), ground cracks, on the 
order of 100-cm wide and 185-cm deep were also observed along the gentle inboard (land-side) 
slope of the stopbank (Figure 6.18). Lateral spread cracks with massive ejecta were observed at 
the toe of the embankment (Figure 6.19). Also, a skate park that was located about midway up 
the gently sloping inboard side of the stopbank was severely damaged by lateral spreading 
(Figure 6.20). Settlement/slumping of the foot path on the crest of the stopbank on the order of 
10-30 cm were also noted. Detailed maps of the largest lateral spread cracks will be provided in 
subsequent versions of this report. 
Two bore holes were made using a hand auger near the lateral spread cracks (43.384767˚S, 
172.661133˚E and 43.384683˚S, 172.661350˚E). However, the profile largely consisted of 
random fill (gravels/cobbles and wood), making it difficult to advance the auger. One of the bore 
holes went down to a depth of ~5.5 m, yet a thick layer of soil matching the liquefaction ejecta 
material could not be found. However, thin (< 10 cm) alternating layers of loose saturated sand 
and very wet, very soft clay/plastic silt were encountered, particularly near the large lateral 
spread crack shown in Figure 6.18. This lateral spread crack had no trace of ejecta in and/or 
immediately near it. This crack was closer to the river than ones that were filled with ejecta at the 
toe of the stopbank ~30 m away (Figure 6.19).  
Houses across from the stopbank on Charles St underwent significant earthquake-induced 
settlement. This damage is discussed in detail in the Impact on Structures chapter.   
Further east along the Kaiapoi River (~400 m), the ground adjacent to a 6-m diameter structure 
(containing an underground tank and control equipment) settled by about 30 cm, resulting in 
damage to pipes attached to the tank (Figure 6.21). Additionally, aerial photographs of lateral 
spreading along the north bank of the Kaiapoi River going east from the town centre are shown 
in Figure 6.22.   
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Figure 6.17 Photo 15: Visitors Information Centre on the stopbank on the north side of the 
Kaiapoi River. The location of this photograph is denoted in Figure 6.2. (43.387384˚S, 
172.659743˚E) 
     
 
Figure 6.18 Photos 16-18: Lateral spread cracks along landside of the stopbank on the north side 
of the Kaiapoi River. The locations of these photographs are denoted in Figure 6.2. 
(43.384484˚S, 172.660653˚E) 
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Figure 6.19 Photos 19-20: Lateral spread cracks along landside of the stopbank on the north side 
of the Kaiapoi River. The locations of these photographs are denoted in Figure 6.2. 
(43.384633˚S, 172.661231˚E) 
 
 
Figure 6.20 Photo 21: Skate park on the stopbank on the north side of the Kaiapoi River. The 
location of this photograph is denoted in Figure 6.2. (43.384094˚S, 172.660370˚E) 
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Figure 6.21 Photo 22: The photograph numbers correspond to the locations denoted in Figure 
6.2. (43.386918˚S, 172.664412˚E) 
 
 
    
Figure 6.22 Photos 23-24: Aerial photographs of lateral spreading of stopbanks on the north bank 
of the Kaiapoi River. The locations of these photographs are denoted in Figure 6.2. (left: 
43.387389˚S, 172.666173˚E; right: 43.386875˚S, 172.672297˚E) 
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The stopbank along the south bank of the Kaiapoi River also experienced extensive lateral 
cracking, and the adjacent homes on Raven Quay experienced significant post-earthquake 
settlement. Figures 6.23-6.26 are photographs of the stopbank on the south bank of the river. 
 
 
Figure 6.23 Photo 25: Lateral spread cracks along riverside stopbank on the south side of the 
Kaiapoi River. The location of this photograph is denoted in Figure 6.2. (43.385254˚S, 
172.660131˚E) 
 
Figure 6.24 Photo 26: Lateral spread cracks along riverside stopbank on the south side of the 
Kaiapoi River. The location of this photograph is denoted in Figure 6.2. (43.385839˚S, 
172.660941˚E) 
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Figure 6.25 Photo 27: Lateral spread cracks along the top of the stopbank on the south side of the 
Kaiapoi River. The location of this photograph is denoted in Figure 6.2. (43.385693˚S, 
172.660688˚E) 
 
 
 
Figure 6.26 Photo 28: Failed drainage conduits running underneath the stopbank on the south 
side of the Kaiapoi River. The location of this photograph is denoted in Figure 6.2. 
(43.388679˚S, 172.666203˚E) 
 
Seismic Performance of Oxidation Pond Embankments 
The geotechnical reconnaissance team also performed damage surveys on foot at the sewage 
treatment plant oxidation pond embankments in Bromley and Kaiapoi. 
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Kaiapoi Sewage Treatment Plant 
The Kaiapoi Sewage Treatment Plant, operated by the Waimakariri District Council, is located 
between Kaiapoi and Pines Beach and is bordered to the south by the Waimakariri River 
stopbank. From 2001 to 2003, the average and peak daily inflows were 3,235 and 10,695 m3/day, 
respectively, and the average and peak daily outflows were 1,163 and 5,565 m3/day, respectively 
(CH2M Beca Ltd., 2003). An aerial image of the plant is shown in Figure 6.27. 
 
 
Figure 6.27 Aerial image of the Kaiapoi Sewage Treatment Plant. The southern perimeter (~0.6 
km) of the oxidation ponds (bottom of image) forms the stopbanks of the north side of the 
Waimakariri River. (43.384583˚S, 172.688240˚E) 
 
The geotechnical reconnaissance team performed a damage survey on foot of the stopbanks 
along the southern perimeter of the plant, denoted by the white line in Figure 6.27. No damage 
was observed along this stretch of the stopbanks, although the team observed large lateral spread 
cracks (~30-cm wide) in the stopbanks and shoreline about 100 m west of the southwest corner 
of the plant (Figure 6.27). Photographs of the liquefaction and lateral spread features at this 
location are shown in Figure 6.28. 
Area of observed 
liquefaction and lateral 
spreading 
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Figure 6.28 Liquefaction and lateral spread features on or near stopbanks located about 100 to 
200 m west of the Kaiapoi Sewage Treatment Plant. (upper left: 43.389175˚S, 172.683235˚E; 
upper right: 43.389701˚S, 172.683390˚E; bottom left: 43.389519˚S, 172.682203˚E; bottom right: 
43.389432˚S, 172.6682060˚E) 
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Bromley Sewage Treatment Plant 
The wastewater treatment plant operated by the Christchurch City Council is situated at 
Bromley, approximately 6.5 km east of the Christchurch CBD and southwest of the Bexley 
subdivision. Here the domestic and industrial wastewater of Christchurch is treated before being 
discharged to the ocean via an outfall that discharges 3.2 km off the coastline. The treatment 
system comprises screening, sedimentation tanks, trickling filters, clarifiers and tertiary 
treatment within the oxidation pond system before discharge to the outfall. The capacity of the 
outfall is 5.5 m3/s and the treatment plant was operating at around 2 m3/s at the time of the 
earthquake. The oxidation ponds were constructed in the early 1960's and cover an area of 
around 230 ha (Figure 6.29). 
 
 
Figure 6.29 Aerial image of the Bromley Sewage Treatment Plant. (43.535029˚S, 172.714052˚E) 
 
Pond 1 
Pond 2B 
Pond 4 
Pond 3 
Pond 6 
Pond 5 
Pond 2A 
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Dyers Road along State Highway 74 cuts through the oxidation ponds and connects the northern 
approaches to Christchurch with the port of Lyttelton to the south. Road pavements were cracked 
at the side of the oxidation ponds (between Ponds 2A and 3) and the road was impassable 
following the earthquake. According to the engineer interviewed at the site, a 50 cm wide crack 
had opened near the centreline of the road, although it was already filled with compacted dense 
graded aggregate during the site visit (Figure 6.30). Nevertheless, longitudinal cracks were still 
evident on the side of the road (Figure 6.31). 
 
Figure 6.30 Repaired road that runs between Ponds 2 and 4.  (43.529933˚S, 172.715200˚E) 
 
 
Figure 6.31 Lateral spread cracks running along the side and parallel to the road that runs 
between Ponds 2 and 4. (S43.531393˚, 172.712473˚E) 
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The middle third of the Pond 1/2A embankment sustained the most severe failure throughout the 
pond system over a length of around 450 m. At this location there are multiple deep longitudinal 
cracks along the embankment (Figure 6.32). The cracks were 150 cm deep and up to 70 cm wide 
at the top. Many of the cracks were interconnected and some were transverse to the embankment, 
running from Pond 1 to Pond 2A. There is a 122 cm diameter concrete pipeline beneath Pond 1 
which can take flow from the treatment plant and bypass it directly to Pond 4. This pipeline 
"floated" over several hundreds of metres by up to 1.2 m in elevation, but typically less than 30 
cm (Figure 6.33). During site inspections on Monday 6th and Tuesday 7th September 2010 there 
were no observations that the pipeline had "floated". Also examination of the Google GeoEye 
image taken hours after the earthquake showed no trace of this pipe. The pipe was firstly 
observed to have "floated" on the 9th September 2010 as the pond water level was being lowered 
as part of the emergency mitigation measures. 
 
Figure 6.32 Lateral spread cracks running parallel to Dyers Road adjacent to Pond 2A 
(43.531393˚S, 172.712473˚E) 
      
Figure 6.33 Buckled pipe protruding from Pond 1 during pond dewatering, and after pond level 
was lowered. Pipeline crown was at the pond invert prior to the earthquake. (43.530867°S, 
172.705190°E) 
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The discharge weir structure at the outlet of Pond 2B has three pipes that transfers flow to Pond 
3. The pipelines consist of two original pipelines of 90 cm diameter and a larger more recent 
pipeline of 180 cm diameter. The weir structure is located out into the pond and allows flow over 
individual weirs on all four sides. Each of the three pipelines became dislocated in the gap 
between the structure and the embankment allowing water to flow directly in to the pipelines at 
the gaps formed in the pipe separations. Furthermore, sink-holes were formed on the 
embankment berms and in the middle of Dyers Road indicating that the pipes had separated 
beneath the embankment fill (Figure 6.34). The eastern end of Pond 2B was cracked and the 
internal side of the embankment had slumped into Pond 2B by up to 40 cm at its eastern end. The 
slumping was also evident along most of the length of the Pond 2A/2B internal baffle which was 
recently constructed in 2004. Sand boils were also evident along the toe drain which runs along 
the northern side of Ponds 2B, 3 and 6 (sand boils were rare on top of the embankments). 
Extensive cracking was experienced along the majority of the embankment that separates Ponds 
3 and 6. The total length of this embankment is around 600 m in length and severe to moderate 
cracking was experienced over a length of about 450 m. Several sets of cracks were noted to 
exist across the width of the embankment at the worst affected locations. The larger of the cracks 
were around 40 cm to 50 cm in width and around 150 cm deep. The base of the crack was not 
visible due to either pond water or collapse debris blocking its lower extent. A small sinkhole 
had formed over the outlet pipeline from the northernmost weir structure in Pond 3. As with the 
pipelines beneath Dyers Road, it would appear that the pipeline was either broken and/or the 
spigot had been pulled from its collar allowing soils to fall down in to the pipeline. 
Numerous small sand boils were encountered across the floor of the estuary adjacent to Pond 6. 
One of these sand boils was observed to be flowing water 80 hours after the main earthquake.  
While not directly inspected, when viewed at low tide it appeared that there has been 
considerable liquefaction along the alignment of the outfall pipeline (commissioned in 2010) 
which traverses across the estuary to the New Brighton spit. A large volume of ejecta appears to 
be located near to the main channel in the estuary (location of thinnest cover over the pipeline). 
The distortion of the embankments noted above is indicative of bearing failure of the 
embankment as it has settled and spread in to the liquefied sub-soils, with large tension cracks 
forming through the fill used to form the embankments and pulling apart of concrete pipelines as 
the fill has spread. Site investigations undertaken indicate that the soils beneath the pond 
embankments are potentially liquefiable to depths of 10 m to 15 m. 
Because of the slumping of the pond banks, engineers decided to drop the pond water levels and 
reduce the hydraulic pressures on the embankments. At the time of the reconnaissance team visit, 
sheet piles were being driven into the Pond 3/6 embankment to stabilize it and arrest further 
movement (Figure 6.35). Furthermore, the pipelines beneath Dyers Road were being replaced. 
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Figure 6.34 Lateral spread cracks at the eastern end of Pond 2B. The sink hole in the foreground 
of the photo on the right formed over the top of two outlet pipelines. (43.52895˚S, 
172.717300˚E) 
 
 
 
    
Figure 6.35 Sheetpiles being driven to stabilize the pond embankment to arrest further 
movement.  (43.530563˚S, 172.718349˚E) 
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7. EFFECTS ON LIFELINES 
Over the past decade, the people of Canterbury have undertaken a deliberate and dedicated effort 
to increase the resiliency of the entire lifeline system within the region. And, with the exception 
of water and waste water distribution lines in the areas affected by liquefaction, lifelines 
performed quite well. The case for hardening of the lifelines was made in the report “Risks and 
Realities: A Multi-Disciplinary Approach to the Vulnerability of Lifelines to Natural Hazards” 
(CAENZ 1997). Following preparation of the report, a plan to enhance the resiliency of lifelines 
in Canterbury was developed and implemented across all sectors, including transportation, water, 
waste water, electric power, and communications. In addition, the interdependence of lifelines 
was recognized and addressed through detailed planning and coordination efforts. 
This chapter includes the NZ-GEER Geotechnical Team observations for the transportation 
system (bridges, highways, rail, airports, and ports), water and wastewater systems, electric 
power, waste management and landfill, as well as other lifelines. 
 
The Transportation System 
While the transportation system did suffer some damage from the earthquake, mobility about the 
Canterbury region was essentially unaffected with few exceptions.  
Bridges, abutments, and approach fills 
In general, the performance of bridge foundations, abutments, and approach fills in the 
earthquake was satisfactory, as almost all bridges were serviceable after the event.  According to 
post earthquake reconnaissance performed by the New Zealand Natural Hazard Platform Bridge 
Research Group, eight road bridges were out of service in the days following the earthquake, and 
five remained closed for at least 5 days.  One bridge with a ruptured sewer line crossing it (the 
Kainga Road Bridge in Brooklands) remained out of service for more than 11 days after the 
earthquake.  However, that bridge may have remained closed at the request of local authorities to 
limit access by outsiders to an area extensively damaged by liquefaction. Except for one bridge 
with structural damage, these bridge closures were due to damage on the approaches to the 
bridge, e.g. liquefaction, lateral spreading, and settlement of approach fills.  However, none of 
the road bridges were damaged to the extent that they will need immediate replacement.  Six 
pedestrian bridges were unserviceable after the earthquake and will need to be replaced.  While 
these pedestrian bridges suffered significant structural damage, the primary factor inducing 
structural distress in most of these cases appears to have been liquefaction-induced lateral 
spreading at the abutments.  In several cases minor leaks in water pipes crossing road bridges 
were reported.   One railway bridge was reported to need repair. 
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The geotechnical bridge reconnaissance team conducted visual inspections of six road bridges, 
one railway bridge, and two pedestrian bridges.  However, in some cases the inspection was 
limited to visual observation from a distance.   There was no apparent major damage to bridge 
foundations, although one abutment wall founded on piles appears to have back-rotated slightly.  
At several of the vehicular bridges, liquefaction-induced lateral spreading was observed in the 
approach embankments, abutment fills, and in the banks adjacent to the bridge.  At road bridge 
locations where lateral spreading, or incipient lateral spreading, was observed in the abutments, 
the tendency for the abutments to converge (move inwards towards the centre of the span) 
appears to have been resisted by the bridge deck, though there was typically signs of lateral 
spreading of the approach embankments perpendicular to the roadway.   Cracking of abutment 
retaining walls was observed at several of these road bridge locations.  At the two pedestrian 
bridges that the team visited the light deck did not have enough structural strength to resist 
movement into the channel at the abutments and the bridge decks buckled to accommodate the 
convergence of the abutments.  At the Kainga Road Bridge, the ruptured sewer pipe crossing the 
bridge continued to discharge untreated sewage into the river for at least 12 days after the 
earthquake. More detailed descriptions of the NZ-GEER Reconnaissance Team's findings 
follows. 
South Brighton (Bridge Street) Bridge 
Perhaps the most significant damage at the road bridges observed by the geotechnical bridge 
reconnaissance team was at the Bridge Street bridge in South Brighton (43.5253˚S, 172.7242˚E), 
an approximately 70 m span with a centre pier and seat type abutments and a slight skew (less 
than 30 degrees) spanning the Avon River.  The bridge was reportedly closed for approximately 
10 days following the earthquake due to differential settlement at the east abutment.  When the 
Team arrived on the 11th day after the earthquake, dense graded aggregate had been placed and 
compacted on the approach to the east abutment (Figure 7.1) and traffic was moving across the 
bridge once again.  Cracking along the margins of the roadway and incipient lateral spreading 
perpendicular to the roadway was observed (Figure 7.2).  There was also incipient spreading 
along the river bank on both sides of the east abutment (Figure 7.3).   Closure of the gap between 
the bridge deck and abutment at the seat for the deck (Figure 7.4) as well as displacement on the 
bearing pads (Figure 7.5) suggests that the abutment moved slightly towards the channel.  
However, the abutment wall is supported on several rows of 14 inch octagonal precast, pre-
stressed concrete piles, including a row of batter piles (piles installed on an angle) with a 3:1 
batter (inclination), as observed at the west abutment where the piles are exposed (Figure 7.6).  
Incipient lateral spreading of the bridge abutment, lateral spreading along the banks of the river 
(Figure 7.7), and closure of the gap at the bridge seat were also observed at the west abutment.  
The west abutment also appeared to have back-rotated slightly, possibly due to liquefaction-
induced settlement of the approach fill, as evidenced by a gap between the back wall and the end 
fill (Figure 7.8) and tilting of the approach slab at the wing wall (Figure 7.9).  There also 
appeared to have been some pounding between the south edge of the west end of the bridge deck 
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and the abutment wall (Figure 7.4). The New Zealand Natural Hazard Platform Bridge Research 
Group has reported a thin horizontal crack just above the water line on the centre pier of this 
structure.  However, both the bridge superstructure and its foundations appeared to be 
structurally intact and the bridge has been reopened for traffic.  
Christchurch Avon River Bridges (Swanns Road, Gayhurst Road, Pedestrian Bridge) 
Incipient lateral spreading of the bridge approach fills and abutments walls and cracking of 
abutment walls were observed at bridges across the Avon River in Christchurch at Swanns Road 
(43.5222˚S, 172.6600˚E) and Gayhurst Road (43.5217˚S, 172.6728˚E).  Both bridges are relative 
small (approximately 30 m) simple spans with integral abutments constructed in 1954.  At both 
locations cracking in the roadway on the approaches to the bridge (Figure 7.10) and at Swanns 
Road lateral spreading of the approach fill (Figure 7.11), incipient lateral spreading at the 
abutments (Figures 7.12 and 7.13), and cracking of the abutment and retaining walls (Figure 7.14 
and 7.15) was observed. However, both bridges remained serviceable. At the footbridge crossing 
over the river approximately midway between the Swanns Road and Gayhurst Road bridges, just 
south of where Medway Road joins River Road on the west bank of the Avon River (43.531˚S, 
172.6656˚E), the rather light deck of the bridge buckled to accommodate the lateral spreading at 
the abutments (Figure 7.16). 
Kaiapoi Bridges (Williams Street, Pedestrian Bridges) 
Behaviour similar to that observed along the Avon River in Christchurch was also observed at 
Kaiapoi River crossings.  Incipient lateral spreading, cracking in the approach roadway, and 
cracking in the abutment walls was observed at the Williams Street Bridge (43.3825˚S, 
172.6575˚E) (Figures 7.17, 7.18) and buckling of the lightweight deck of a pedestrian bridge due 
to convergence of abutments as a result of lateral spreading was observed just north of Williams 
Street, in the vicinity of Trousselot Park (43.3811˚S, 172.6558˚E) (Figure 7.19).  Evidence of 
liquefaction and incipient lateral spreading was also observed along the walking path from the 
Williams Street Bridge to Trousselot Park and in the park itself (Figure 7.20).    
Waimakariri River Bridges (Chaneys Overpass, Highway 1 River Crossings) 
Cracking and incipient lateral spreading was observed at the northern transition between the 
approach embankment and the abutment at Chaneys overpass (Figure 7.21), where Highway 1 
crosses over the Christchurch Northern Motorway (43.4300˚S, 172.6464˚E).  The bridge is a 
three span bridge of about 80 m with what appeared to be seat-type abutments retrofit with cable 
restrainers (Figure 7.22).  However, outside of a few ruptured precast concrete tiles that covered 
the end embankment for the north abutment (Figure 7.23), there was no apparent damage to the 
bridge structure or its foundation, despite ample evidence of liquefaction beneath the bridge 
(Figure 7.24). The overpass is located in a low lying area that appears to be the flood plain of the 
Waimakariri River that was subject to extensive liquefaction (Figure 7.25).  Cracking was 
observed in and adjacent to the roadway in the vicinity of the overpass (Figure 7.26) and road 
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crews were busy regrading and paving the approach to the roadway that passed under the 
overpass (Figure 7.27). This work was undertaken to repair the liquefaction damage to the on-
ramp to the motorway. 
The NZ-GEER reconnaissance team also inspected the two main spans for the Highway 1 
crossing of the Waimakariri River (43.4153˚S, 172.6467˚E) (Figure 7.28) and the adjacent 
railroad bridge (43.4128˚S, 172.6508˚E).  While there was some evidence of liquefaction 
adjacent to several of the piers for the east span of the Highway 1 crossing (Figure 7.29), there 
was no indication of displacement of the foundation piers or structural damage to the bridge. 
Kainga Road Bridge to Brooklands Residential Community  
The Kainga Road Bridge is a short span bridge leading to the Brooklands residential community 
(Figure 7.30), and according to the New Zealand Natural Hazard Platform Bridge Research 
Group, the bridge remained closed at the time of the Team’s visit on 13 September 2010 at the 
request of local authorities to limit access to an adjacent area extensively damaged by 
liquefaction. Structurally, the 1963 mixed girder-slab reinforced concrete bridge was in good 
condition.  However, movement of the northeast abutment wing wall resulted in damage to an 
18-cm diameter sewage pipe that was rigidly connected along the bridge span (Figure 7.31). Raw 
sewage continued to flow into the river from the damaged pipe at the time of the site visit (Figure 
7.32a). Posted signs and discussions with locals confirmed that the flow was contaminated liquid 
(Figure 7.32b). Directly below the bridge, a pipe of similar diameter suffered no damage, and the 
team noted that its support to the abutment wall was filled with flexible foam (Figure 7.33). At 
the East abutment, the northern wing wall moved towards the river and developed a gap with its 
backfill soils of about 2 cm, whereas the southern wing wall appeared to remain fixed. Soil 
spread away from the east abutment south wing wall leaving a gap of about 4 – 6 cm at its toe. 
Surrounding low lying marshlands and old paddock fields (as indicated by a postal worker 
interviewed during our visit) showed evidence of liquefaction (Figure 7.34). 
The fills at the east and west approaches to the bridge appeared to have settled, but were repaired 
prior to the Teams visit. This road is one of the three access routes into the communities of 
Brooklands and Spencerville, the other being Lower Styx Road and Spencerville Rd. Extensive 
liquefaction was observed in Brooklands, including uplifting of sewer manholes along 
approximately 2 km of Lower Styx Road. 
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Figure 7.1  Repaired east approach to the Bridge Street Bridge 
 
 
  
Figure 7.2 Cracking on margins of west approach embankment, Bridge Street Bridge 
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Figure 7.3 Lateral spreading of east banks adjacent to the Bridge Street Bridge 
 
 
a) West abutment gap closure and spalling 
 
b) East abutment gap closure 
Figure 7.4 Bridge Street Bridge expansion gap closure 
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Figure 7.5 West abutment bearing pad displacement, Bridge Street Bridge (scale in Inches) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.6  West abutment batter (angled) pile, Bridge Street Bridge 
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Figure 7.7 Lateral spreading on west bank, Bridge Street Bridge 
 
 
Figure 7.8  Gap between west abutment backwall and end embankment, Bridge Street Bridge 
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Figure 7.9  Back rotation of west abutment, Bridge Street Bridge 
 
 
Figure 7.10 Cracking of roadway on west approach fill, Swanns Road Bridge 
  145
 
 
Figure 7.11  Lateral spreading on west approach fill, Swanns Road Bridge 
 
 
Figure 7.12  Incipient lateral spreading at west abutment, Swanns Road Bridge 
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Figure 7.13 Incipient lateral spreading at north abutment, Gayhurst Road Bridge 
 
 
 
Figure 7.14 Cracking of north abutment, Swanns Road Bridge 
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Figure 7.15 Cracking of retaining wall, north bank of the Avon River 
 
 
 
 
a) Buckled span b) Sheared bearing on east bank 
Figure 7.16  Footbridge on the Avon River near Medway Road 
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Figure 7.17  Cracking of east approach roadway, Williams Road Bridge 
 
 
Figure 7.18  Incipient lateral spreading of east abutment, Williams Road Bridge 
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Figure 7.19  Buckling of footbridge near Trousselot Park 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.20  Cracking of sidewalk and evience of liquefaction in Trousselot Park 
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Figure 7.21 Incipient lateral spreading at Chaneys Overpass north abutment 
 
 
 
Figure 7.22  Cable Restrainers at north abutment, Chaneys Overpass 
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Figure 7.23  Displaced concrete tiles on end embankment for north abutment, Chaneys Overpass 
 
 
Figure 7.24  Evidence of liquefaction beneath Chaneys Overpass 
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Figure 7.25  Evidence of liquefaction adjacent to Chaneys Overpass 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.26  Cracking in and along roadway adjacent to Chaneys Overpass 
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Figure 7.27  Road being repaved adjacent on south approach to Chaneys Overpass 
 
 
 
Figure 7.28  Highway bridge across the Waimakariri River 
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Figure 7.29  Evidence of liquefaction at Highway 1 bridge piers on the north side of the 
Waimakariri River 
 
 
(a) (b) 
Figure 7.30 Kainga Road Bridge to the Brooklands residential community (a) GoogleEarth 
image (43.3998˚S, 172.6910˚E) and (b) overview of bridge looking west (43.3997˚S, 
172.6916˚E). 
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Figure 7.31 Damage to sewage pipe at the Kainga Road Bridge (43.3997°S, 172.6916°E) 
 
 
 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 7.32 Outflow from damaged pipe at Kainga Road Bridge and surrounding warnings to the 
community (43.3997°S, 172.6916°E). 
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Figure 7.33 Below the East end of the Kainga road bridge (looking northeast). (43.3998°S, 
172.6914°E). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.34 Evidence of liquefaction in surrounding low lying marshlands on the east side of the 
Kainga road bridge (43.3995°S, 172.6917°E). 
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Highways 
Most highways and major surface transportation routes remained open following the earthquake, 
or were only closed temporarily for inspection or minor repairs. Due to a rock fall along 
Highway 1 between Waipara and Kaikoura, the route remained closed 10 days following the 
earthquake, but it is not clear if the earthquake was a contributing factor since locals reported the 
section of roadway had had ongoing problems and there was heavy rainfall in the area prior to 
the earthquake. An alternative route along Highway 7 to Kaikoura was available. The Highway 
74 tunnel from Christchurch to Lyttelton was briefly closed due to a rock fall, and Evans Pass 
Road was closed in the days following the earthquake due to a rock fall and remained closed 
after 10 days. While the closure of Evans Pass Road had only minor effect on mobility between 
the Lyttelton Port of Christchurch and the rest of the South Island, it is one of the primary 
alternative routes between the Port and Christchurch should the tunnel be closed. The tunnel 
closure, however, only lasted a few hours. In the communities affected by liquefaction, a few 
roads remained closed 10 days following the earthquake, but alternative access routes were 
available in all areas. 
Rail System 
The Canterbury region has a rail system used primarily to carrying coal to the Port for export as 
well as for tourism trains. Railroad bridges are primarily of steel construction.  The New Zealand 
Natural Hazard Platform Bridge Research Group reported damage to one railroad bridge from 
the earthquake. Rail service was also impacted from bent rails fault trace and as a result of 
slumping ground in some locations.   
Damage to railways embankments was reported by members of the New Zealand reconnaissance 
team near Rolleston (Figure 7.35) and Woodward Glenn, just south of Kaiapoi (Figure 7.36).  In 
the latter case, the damage appeared due to liquefaction-induced lateral spreading.  By the time 
the team arrived in Rolleston (13 days after the earthquake), the damage to the tracks had been 
repaired. The Team was informed that the damaged rail line at Rolleston was fixed the day of or 
the day after the earthquake and that the slumping rail lines at Woodford Glen had been repaired 
4 days after the earthquake. 
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Figure 7.35  Railway Embankment at Rolleston (photo by I. McGregor)
  
    
Figure 7.36  Damage to rail line at Woodford Glen (photo by L.Matthews and J. Overend) 
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Christchurch International Airport 
The Christchurch International Airport was closed temporarily for inspection and minor clean 
up, but was re-opened with full service within 9 hours of the earthquake. The airports’ corporate 
offices were closed and temporarily relocated. 
 
Lyttelton Port of Christchurch 
Lyttelton Port of Christchurch (LPC) is the main port for the Canterbury region and of critical 
importance to the economy of the South Island. It handles coal, automobiles and fuel products, 
and about 250,000 TEU of containerized cargo annually. The terminals at the port are of a 
variety of ages, ranging the 1880’s to current.  
The intensity of the Darfield Earthquake in the port area was essentially the operating basis 
earthquake for the port, having a PGA of 0.33g (as measured by a strong motion station within 
the Port). Port facilities are undergoing strengthening as part of the program to increase lifeline 
resilience in the region.  While some Port facilities sustained significant damage, most Port 
facilities were operational within hours after the earthquake and no scheduled shipments were 
missed. By 0700 on 4 September 2010, the two main piers and a portion of the coal terminal 
were operational. The container terminal was opened by 1500 on 5 September 2010. The coal 
terminal was fully operational on 8 September 2010, and the liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) 
terminal was opened on 10 September 2010. Port officials were quite satisfied with the 
performance, but acknowledge that there will be significant repairs and rebuilding in the coming 
months. 
LPC has three container cranes, each with a 19-m rail spacing. While there was some lateral 
(seaward) movement of the deck for the container terminal, no damage to the cranes was noted 
and they were still performing as intended after the earthquake. The crane rails are closely 
enough spaced that both rails fit on the wharf deck. Having both rails on the deck appears to 
have avoided differential movement of the rails (despite the lateral displacement of the deck) and 
contributed to the good performance of the Port facilities. 
The soil profile at the Port typically consists of 10 m or more soft clay and silty sand layers 
underlain by rock, along with some un-engineered fill and boulder rip-rap. Liquefiable soils are 
limited to a few seams within the natural sediments and are believed to have had no impact on 
the performance of the port. All wharves are on vertical pile foundations, including hardwood 
timber piles, 600-mm diameter reinforced concrete piles, 600-mm square reinforced concrete 
piles, and steel pipe piles. Many are skin-friction piles that develop their vertical capacity within 
the underlying clay and sandy soil layers. No damage to any piles was observed, though some 
were noted to have apparently settled up to 0.3 m, becoming disengaged from the wharf deck. 
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All the wharves underwent limited settlement and lateral deformation, though limited to 0.2 to 
0.3 m. Typical damage from settlement and lateral deformation are shown in Figures 7.37-7.39 . 
The limited wharf movements did open up cracks in the asphalt pavement sections of the wharf 
deck. In order to keep the port operational, Port officials were considering different temporary 
repair alternatives, including grouting, sand infill, or crushed rock.  Port engineers also expressed 
concerned that the concrete pavement in the backlands areas was bridging over voids that 
developed due to lateral displacement of retaining walls at the back of the wharves that 
accompanied lateral displacement of the deck. 
The underground 11kV electric power network remained in service following the earthquake, 
though the single sub-station at the port did sustain some minor damage. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.37 Settlement and lateral deformation at fuel transfer facility (43.60750˚S, 
172.71332˚E). 
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Figure 7.38 Temporary wooden support to accommodate settlement under fuel line (43.60783˚S, 
172.71373˚E) 
 
 
Figure 7.39 Cracking along jetty at eastern end of port (43.61023˚S, 172.73345˚E). 
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Oil Terminal at the Lyttelton Port of Christchurch 
The Team visited the Oil Terminal side of the Lyttelton Port of Christchurch (Figure 7.40) on 13 
September 2010, and the most significant damage was the area leased to the Fulton Hogan 
Bitumen plant (fultonhogan.com). The Team visited this plant and discussed observations with 
the plant manager, Steve Platt. He was advised by port officials that approximately 10 cm of 
lateral spreading of the wharf supporting the plants facilities had occurred on the eastern water 
face of the terminal.  
As a result of the lateral spreading, as well as liquefaction within the bitumen plant, four tanks 
and some supporting piping suffered movement and damage. The most severe lateral movement 
was that of Tank 1 (located at 43.6085°S, 172.7149°E), which moved laterally 50 mm towards 
the water. Tank 2 (43.608768°S, 172.714651°E) settled uniformly about 30 mm causing 
separation of the connecting bridge between it and a neighbouring tank of like geometry (Figure 
7.42). This tank, with dimensions of 12.8 m high by 13 m diameter, housed used oil and was 
nearly filled to capacity at the time of the main shock, weighing an estimated 550 tons. Tanks 3 
and 4 (43.6085°S, 172.7149°E) were side-by-side and each experienced movement that resulted 
in pullout of nearly all perimeter anchor bolts at their base. These tanks were 12.5 m tall by 6 m 
diameter with an estimated 150 ton weight at the time of the main shock. Crews were repairing 
the support anchorage for Tanks 3 and 4 with the retrofit shown in Figure 7.43. No structural 
damage to the tanks was observed and flexible connections survived the strong shaking with only 
minor leakage. Asphalt repair using cement injection to fill the lateral spread cracks was on-
going during the teams visit (Figure 7.44). Sand boils were also observed at several locations 
within the plants boundaries. Soil samples of the ejecta indicated the material was clean sand 
with little to no fines (Figure 7.45). 
A seismic station was also identified within the plants boundaries housed within the plant main 
entry building (43.6086°S, 172.7136°E), but was not operational for the main shock. Workers 
attempted to power it following the main shock and Mr. Platt believes it was on during the 5.1 
aftershock centred below the Port Hills.  
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(a) (b) 
Figure 7.40 Port of Lyttelton locating the oil terminal area (GoogleEarth image; 43.6088°S, 
172.7140°E) and (b) Aerial view of the Fulton Hogan Bitumen Plant (image taken from 
43.6068°S, 172.7272°E) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.41 Zoomed into the region of the Fulton Hogan Bitumen Plant (GoogleEarth image; 
43.6088°S, 172.7140°E). 
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Figure 7.42 Tank 2 (right most large white tank) with Tanks 3 and 4 shown to the left (smaller 
grey tanks) at the Fulton Hogan Bitumen Plant (43.6088°S, 172.7147°E). 
 
 
 
Figure 7.43 Typical repair to Tank 3 and 4 (addition of clamp plates). Note the pullout of the 
original anchorage. Fulton Hogan Bitumen Plant (43.6085°S, 172.7149°E). 
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Figure 7.44 Repair of lateral spread cracks within the Fulton Hogan Bitumen Plant, nearby Tank 
3.  (43.6085°S, 172.7150°E). 
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Figure 7.45 Laser diffraction tests of samples taken from ejecta observed at the Fulton Hogan 
Bitumen Plant. Sample WP169 taken at 43.6087°S, 172.7142°E. 
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Water and Wastewater Systems 
By far the greatest impact on the community was the performance of water and wastewater 
systems in the Canterbury region. The Christchurch, Selwyn, and Waimakariri Districts all 
experienced damage to the pipe networks in areas affected by liquefaction, resulting in loss of 
service and discharge of untreated wastewater into the groundwater and surface water. 
In all three districts, drinking water is untreated well water. Water mains are predominately 
asbestos-cement pipe, with newer pipes being HDPE. All wastewater pipes are concrete bell-
and-spigot. Damage to both systems was concentrated in the areas affected by liquefaction. 
 
Christchurch City Council 
A precautionary water boil advisory was put in place immediately after the earthquake by the 
Christchurch City Council (CCC) and was lifted on 9 September 2010, with only two minor 
problems being reported. CCC officials estimate that 6 to 7 km of water mains will need to be 
replaced, and the replacement of similar lengths of wastewater pipes are expected. Officials 
observed that crews performed the equivalent of “a year’s worth of maintenance in 6 days.”  
Damage to the CCC’s system was predominately to the water and wastewater mains, as a result 
of ground movement and floating of manholes. A major problem with sewer lines was influx of 
liquefied sand and water through breaks in the line.  Cleaning sand out of sewer pipes and pump 
stations was a major factor affecting restoration of service.  Repair crews found pipes that were 
simply pulled apart, while others were crushed at the joints. No problems were associated with 
pipes crossing bridges that CCC officials were aware of. CCC officials expressed concern about 
voids that may have developed beneath pavements due to the estimated 11,000 tons of sand 
removed from pipes and pump stations (corresponding to a potential void volume of 
approximately 9,000 m3). 
All new pump stations have flexible joints and performed well. At older stations, one pipe with a 
rigid connection was sheared (at Halswell) and one water pump was lost (which was identified as 
vulnerable and scheduled to be replaced).  All pumping stations have back-up power supplies, 
and all worked as intended. The wastewater treatment plant in Christchurch was unaffected by 
the earthquake, though an increase of flows into the plant of up to 20% were observed as a result 
of groundwater inflow through the pipe breaks. 
CCC officials indicated that restoration of drinking water took a priority over wastewater, and 
that work had yet to start on the storm sewer system. Ongoing problems included additional pipe 
breaks and removal of silt and sand from pipes and pumping stations. The CCC asset 
management plan calls for pipe replacement if three breaks are observed in any pipeline over the 
period of one year. They are now doing a cost analysis of clearing pipelines by jetting, Closed-
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Circuit TV (CCTV) inspection, and repair of existing pipelines versus abandonment and 
replacement. As part of the efforts to improve resilience, CCC spends about 1% of their 
maintenance budget on resilience upgrades. 
 
Selwyn District Council 
Most of the water and wastewater networks in the Selwyn District council (SDC) performed 
quite well. Very few breaks were reported, mostly in foothill areas. A blanket water boil advisory 
was lifted 5 days after the earthquake.  The biggest reported problem was the new (less than 3-
yr-old) wastewater treatment plant had to be taken offline, eliminating 1500 m3/day of capacity. 
Flows were fortunately redirected to the old plant that had been recently replaced, but had not yet 
been completely taken out of service. The new plant was running again in 9 days, near 100% 
after 10 days. 
Loss of power to pumping facilities was the most common form of outage. Under established 
protocols, the power network shuts down automatically after a major earthquake, whether there 
is damage or not, and service is not restored until inspections indicate it can be restored safely.  
Most of the large facilities had stand-by power generators and some mobile generators were 
available and used. However, SDC engineers expressed the need for additional mobile units. The 
mobile generators that were available were rotated in order to provide residents with at least 
intermittent services. One complicating factor was the rise in the water level of several drinking 
water wells. According to SDC engineers, the water level in one well rose by 5.3 m, another by 3 
m, and two went artesian and water was pouring out of the electrical connections in the well 
head. 
 
Waimakariri District Council 
While the types of problems were similar, the Waimakariri District Council (WDC) was much 
harder hit than Christchurch, primarily due to the extensive liquefaction and the associated lateral 
spreading in Kaiapoi. A precautionary boil water advisory was still in effect 10 days after the 
earthquake. It was to be lifted on 12 September 2010, but a single sample tested positive for E-
Coli and the advisory was extended. 
WDC officials estimate that the system was providing water to 70% of residents within one day 
of the earthquake, 85% after the second day, and nearly 100% by the ninth day (noting that the 
water was intentionally not restored to several damaged structures). This restoration was to the 
private property lines, beyond which service is the responsibility of individual property owners. 
However, WDC crews were also working with residents to provide service all the way to their 
homes. In hindsight when considering repairs, WDC officials wondered if they could have 
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restored water service more quickly by using more temporary above-ground flexible piping, as 
was done on the final days of restoration. Ten days after the earthquake (on 13 September 2010), 
60% of Kaiapoi’s wastewater was being collected and treated at the wastewater treatment plant.  
However, 40% of sewage system flows were still being discharged into the river untreated.  City 
engineers estimated that the amount of untreated wastewater would be reduced to 5% by 
September 17. 
WDC officials felt the biggest problems were the deep gravity wastewater mains.  In many cases 
these mains were 3 to 4 meters below ground surface with ground water only 2 m deep. In 
addition, some of the mains are located in the backyards of private residences, making access 
and subsequent repairs more difficult.  
 
Residential Communities of Spencerville and Brooklands 
In a number of residential communities, sewage and potable water were problematic 
immediately following the main shock. Perhaps hardest hit were the communities of Spencerville 
and Brooklands. At the time of the Teams visit on 13 September 2010, neither community had a 
functioning wastewater collection system, and Brooklands did not have potable water. 
Liquefaction along Lower Styx road, the primary connection between these two communities, 
caused ground subsidence, a rise in the water table, and uplifting of 25 manholes (Figure 7.46). 
Construction workers were dewatering the region during the Team’s visit and informed us that 
the manholes were 4 m deep. The manholes were approximately 28-46 cm above the existing 
road surface (Figure 7.47).  
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Figure 7.46 Approximately 2km stretch along Lower Styx Road with observed uplifted 
manholes. (GoogleEarth image; 43.4059°S, 172.6999°E). Waypoints 136-160 represent locations 
of elevated manholes. 
 
Figure 7.47 Uplifted manholes along Lower Styx Road, note the continuation of pattern in the 
foreground (43.4113°S, 172.6930°E). 
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Electric Power 
The electric power system performed quite well following the earthquake, with much of the good 
performance attributed to the hardening of the system over the last decade. No problems were 
noted with the generation or transmission system, and problems with the distribution systems 
were primarily associated with liquefaction.  
Orion, the primary service provider in Christchurch, reported restoring power to 90% of 
customers within one day of the earthquake, with much of the remaining 10% not being restored 
as a precautionary measure. Each substation was individually inspected prior to restoring power, 
and many of the older switches were manually reset after being tripped during the earthquake. 
Both 66 kV and 11kV lines are part of the system, with most of the lines located underground. 
The Christchurch network is old and, having many alternate routes, Orion was able to re-route 
power to provide service even though line breaks still existed. Of the 20 high voltage cable faults 
detected, 11still needed to be repaired 10 days after the earthquake. Only two substations in 
Christchurch went offline during the earthquake, both from settlement as a result of liquefaction. 
The last back-up generator was taken off-line on 8 September 2010. 
 
Waste Management & Landfill 
The Kate Valley Landfill, operated by Canterbury Waste Services, is the regional waste disposal 
facility for the affected area.  However, the Christchurch City Council open up a cell at the 
closed Burwood Landfill facility to accommodate the increased volume of waste generated by 
earthquake response and recovery efforts.  Furthermore, limits on the volume of incoming waste 
were temporarily waved at Kate Valley and the facility increased working hours to accommodate 
the increased volume of waste after the earthquake.   
Canterbury Waste Services (CWS) resumed operation and house hold collection of waste two 
days after the earthquake. CWS uses collection centres throughout region and transfers the waste 
to Kate Valley Landfill approximately 65 kilometres north of the city.  On Sunday, the day after 
the earthquake CWS began hauling waste collected before the earthquake from their collection 
centres to clear them in anticipation of increased waste tonnage.  For a two week period 
following the event, the tonnage delivered to the landfill approximately doubled from 800-900 
tons/day to 1700-1800 tons/day. Demolition debris collected in Christchurch was taken to 
recycling centres, with residual waste taken to the reopened cell at the Burwood landfill. 
The CCC and CWS recycle approximately 70% of the total organic waste generated in the 
region, which means that most of the waste entering the regional landfill has a low water content 
and does not decompose.  One of CWS’s concerns was the increased amounts of high water 
content waste from grocery stores and grocery distribution centres entering the landfill after the 
earthquake and creating a potentially unstable waste body.  CWS received permission to 
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temporarily spread high-liquid waste loads on the ground at a local quarry to allow liquids to 
drain prior to disposal in the landfill.  CWS also mixed incoming high water content wastes with 
MSW at the collection centres, thus reducing the water content prior to arrival of the waste at the 
landfill.    
The Team visited the Kate Valley landfill and found that it performed as designed.  The landfill 
is located approximately 85 kilometres from the epicentre. The landfill is a valley fill with 2.5:1 
slide slopes.  The lining configuration consists of an encapsulated membrane back geosynthetic 
clay line/geomembrane system composed of a 0.4 mm high density polyethylene (HDPE) 
geomembrane with 6 mm of dry bentonite adhered to it, overlain by a 1 mm HDPE liner. No 
slipping of the waste body or damage to the lining system was reported by the operator.  No 
other lined structures such as dairy milking barn wastewater ponds or lined reservoirs had 
reported damage. 
 
Other Lifelines 
Other lifelines such as landline and cellular and telephones, fuel supply, television and radio 
performed well in the earthquake. While some land telephone lines were out of service, no 
interruption of cellular telephone service was observed. Service providers were aware of the 
potential for tower battery drawdown in an emergency, as was observed in the 2010 Chile 
Earthquake, but had installed generators at key locations and have agreements with local 
residents to keep them fuelled. 
No interruption in fuel from Lyttelton Port of Christchurch was observed. Television 
broadcasting facility was undamaged and had four days of fuel in preparation for emergency 
power outages. The local bus service was restored on 7 September 2010. 
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